Some aspects of the role of law in international political crises : A case study of Suez 1956 and of Cuba 1962 by McKinnon, Fabian Mark
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
SOME ASPECTS OF THE ROLE OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CRISES:
A CASE STUDY OF SUEZ 195 6 AND OF 
CUBA 1962
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
THE FACULTY OF LAW .
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREDŒNTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF LAWS
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN LAW
BY
FABIAN MARK McKINNON
GLASGOW, GREAT BRITAIN 
MAY, 1981
ProQuest Number: 10644203
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uesL
ProQuest 10644203
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
To my parents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In spite of the modest size and scope of this 
paper I feel it is necessary to express my thanks and 
sense of debt for the help I have received.
I ov/e much to my two thesis advisers, Mr. John 
P. Grant, Head, Department of Public International Law, 
and Dr. W.H. Balekjian, Head, Department of European 
Law, University of Glasgow, who helped, in numerous 
ways, with their guidance, sense of perspective and 
personal encouragement but who always left me with 
enough Carte" 'blanche not to make supervision an 
intellectually stifling exercise.
Also, I am very grateful for having been 
afforded use for two academic years of a study room at 
Glasgow University Library, which greatly eased my 
work. For this I would like to express my gratitude 
to Mr. L.C. Reynolds, Secretary of the Library, and for 
the unfailing support of my two advisers.
For a fruitful summer of research at McGill 
University, Montreal, Canada, I am indebted to the 
Supervisor of the McLennan Graduate Library and the 
Librarian of the Law Faculty Library, who granted me 
full research facilities and helped in every way.
I would like to thank also Dr. Noreen Burrows, 
Department of European Law, University of Glasgow, for
1 1 1
her interest, encouragement and support. At the 
University's Institute of Soviet and East European 
Studies I would like to thank Professor W.V. Wallace, 
its Director, and Mr. J.R. Beerman, who volunteered 
to read this paper and offered suggestions.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, to 
whom my debt is immeasurable and to whom this minor 
paper is dedicated.
I V
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.......................................113.
ABSTRACT  ............................v i ü
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION.. ...............................  1
Purpose and approach
II. THE CRISES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE
BACKGROUND AND OF THE E V E N T S ...............  13
Suez 1956 ...............................  13
Setting and background of the Suez 
Canal: a sketch
The nationalization of the Canal 
Company 
Developments following the 
nationalization 
Resort to force 
The United Nations and the
creation of the Emergency Force 
The cease fire 
Epilogue
Cuba 1962     40
V
III. CRISIS AND FOREIGN POLICY:
THE LEGAL A R G U M E N T S ............................. 54
Suez 1956 ...................................  56
Tripartite London talks:
Tripartite Statement, 2 August, 1956 
Statement by President Nasser 
rejecting invitation to the 
London Conference, 12 August, 1956 
The Twenty-Two Power London Conference:
16-23 August, 1956 
Security Council: 5-13 October, 1956 
Security Council: 30 October, 1956
Cuba 1962 ...................................  76
IV. CRISIS AND FOREIGN POLICY:
THE POLICY-MAKING PERSPECTIVE ................  81
Suez 1956 ...................................  81
Egypt
The United Kingdom 
France
The United States 
Israel
Cuba 1962 ...................................  96
The Soviet Union 
The United States
V. ASPECTS OF THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CRISES ............... 101
Law as a Force in Policy-Making . . . .  105
Constraint 
Foreign policy tool 
Justification
Vi
Law as International Organization . . . 115
Institutional forces 
Institutional framework 
Law institutionalized 
Forum
Legal actor
Law as a Framework of Procedure . . . .  121
and Expectations 
Communication 
Predictability 
Instruments
Some Concluding Notes...................... 12 5
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................... 128
V l l
ABSTRACT
The study undertakes to analyze some aspects 
of the role of law in conflict issues. Two 
international political crises are used as 
case studies. After a brief historical overview, 
the analysts focuses on a) the legal arguments 
advanced in the course of the crises by the 
States concerned; and b) some of the forces at 
work affecting the policy-making processes of 
those States. Finally, against that background, 
the paper suggests eleven ways in which law may 
play a significant role in conflict issues, and 
makes references to instances and aspects of the 
crises previously examined which bear out those 
roles.
The paper concludes a) that law is seen to have 
played several roles; b) that the impact of some 
of these roles has been significant ; c) that law 
is a' force' per' se ; d) that it is necessary, in 
the light of the study, to espouse an appropriately 
broad conception of international law in order to 
understand the nature of its roles and the 
channels through which they are effected.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The history of mankind has been scarred, since 
time immemorial, by the destructiveness of violent ,
conflict. Throughout history peoples of all races 
and creeds have experienced the most horrible 
manifestations and consequences of human conflict.
Man has managed to inflict upon fellow man death and 
destruction, untold pain, misery, deprivation and 
humiliation time after time, in a drift of seeming 
inevitability and with a magnitude and intensity that 
had seemed each time previously unimaginable.
While conflict' per' 'se, channelled into 
peaceful forms of expression and action, may be a 
catalyst and an engine of change oriented toward 
constructive aims, unfortunately the record of history 
shows destruction and war to be far more common 
outcomes. Texts and newspapers brim with accounts of 
countless forms and degrees of past and present 
conflict at all levels and between all kinds of 
groups: racial, social and religious; community, intra­
state and inter-state; from university riots to world 
wars.
Violent conflict and its most extreme form —  
war —  is inimical to growth, freedom and justice. 
Indeed, to paraphrase Jefferson, it is inimical to one 
of the most fundamental of human rights: the pursuit 
of happiness. The search for a better society for
man where these values could flourish —  whether in 
the polls or the nation-state, withering-away-of-the- 
state or world community —  has occupied the thought 
and existence of some of the most powerful minds in 
history. No human endeavour can be truly, globally 
significant if it does not have it as its ultimate end 
to contribute to the amelioration of the human condition 
Yet, in spite of this, no achievement in Engineering or 
in Chemistry, no breakthrough in Medicine or in Physics, 
no advances in Sociology or Psychology, no new light 
shed by the Humanities, or contribution of Law,
Economics or Political Science can be meaningful or 
even relevant if the human race is to be obliterated by 
a thermonuclear world war. World peace, like one's 
own health, is the most fundamental point of 
departure.
Conflict may be defined as "a critical state of
tension occasioned by the presence of mutually
incompatible tendencies within an organismic whole the
functional continuity or structural integrity of which
is thereby threatened."^ Clearly, conflict does not
arise by spontaneous combustion, nor do its violent
and destructive forms originate in a vacuum. Nearly
always the etiology of conflict is to be understood in
complex, deeply-seated processes of interaction of
multiple forces. Thus, in its familiar dysfunctional 
2
form, conflict is a complex and dynamic phenomenon.
^Kurt Singer, "The Resolution of Conflict," 
Social' Research, 16 (1949) , , 230,
2
For a discussion of both the dysfunctional 
and functional effects of conflict, see Lewis Coser, 
The Functions' of Social' Conflict (Glencoe, 111.: The 
Free Press, 1956);. Georg Simmel,' Conf li'ct, trans. 
Kurt Woeff (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1955.)
with the characteristic of threatening, and the 
potentiality of undermining, the very underpinnings 
(and hence the viability) of a community, society, 
region, area, sub-system or even system.
An international system may be conceived as 
"a pattern of relations between the basic units of 
world politics, which is characterized by the scope of 
the objectives pursued by those units and of the 
tasks performed among them, as well as by the means 
used in order to achieve those goals and perform 
those tasks. This pattern is largely determined by 
the structure of the world, the nature of the forces 
which operate across or within the major units, and 
the capabilities, pattern of power, and political 
culture of those units."
The present international system, characterized 
as it is by its loose bi-polar or perhaps even tri- 
polar^ configuration, is marked by the competition of 
each leading bloc member for the expansion of its own 
geopolitical sphere of influence and by a large 
number of uncommitted or "non-aligned" states. Under 
such a system each leading bloc member has an obvious 
interest in "interference," which may be either direct 
or indirect, blatant or subtle, political, economic, 
or military, or any combination of these. This
3
Stanley H. Hoffmann, "International Systems 
and International Law," World Politics, 14 (1961),
207. This definition seems more satisfactory because 
it incorporates both systemic and sub-systemic 
perspectives.
^China presents some typological difficulties. 
Because of its posture of "non-alignment" on some 
issues, because of the function and role it plays in 
its diplomatic relations vis-à-vis both the United 
States and the Soviet Union, because of the ideological 
underpinnings of its social, political and economic
struggle, epitomized by the tensions of the Cold War 
era but certainly still present and inherent in the 
dynamics of the system today, goes on against the 
backdrop of mounting conventional and nuclear arm
5
arsenals. Hence, whatever stability the present 
system may be thought to have —  rather than "stability" 
as such perhaps it would be more appropriate to think 
of a certain' stasis -- in large measure it is due to 
the realities of the so-called balance of terror.
The problems and dangers implicit in an 
international system of this sort have been compounded 
by and enmeshed with the decolonization process and a 
vast and far-reaching technological revolution. Great 
destabilizing-, conflict-creating forces have been at 
play, in their most intensive and dynamic way, in the 
past thirty years. The fall of empires and the birth 
of new states, the race for industrial power and 
better standards of living, the gap between rich and 
poor, the trend of ever-rising expectations, among 
others, have meant a discontented, searching, restless, 
often angry Third World.
All developing countries, without exception, 
have suffered to varying extents from one form or 
another of "growth pains." Their economic and social 
development often has been marred and retarded by one 
or more of such ills as inequalities of income 
distribution, inappropriate patterns of industrial.
system, and because of its' largesse, it could be seen, 
systemically, as a "pole" in itself.
5Systemically, stability may be thought of as 
"the probability that the system retains all of its 
essential characteristics; that no single nation [-state] 
becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to 
survive; and that large-scale war does not occur ;" 
sub-systematically, it may be defined as "the probability
agricultural and financial development, deficient 
infrastructure, unfavourable terms of trade, shortage 
of capital, hunger, illiteracy, disease —  to name 
just a few of the many difficulties. Their political 
development has been beset at times by new, unstable 
political structures and by volatile leaders.
Further potentialities for instability have been 
created by the spread in the Third World of nuclear 
technology for destructive use.^
With the advent of nuclear weapons, mankind 
has reached a watershed. No longer can it afford to 
stake, the maintenance of peace on concerts that play 
out of tune (as Metternich’s often did) or on "great 
experiments" that fail. The world community today 
more than ever before is sitting on a powder keg.
The international system as it stands sees an 
increasingly dissatisfied Third World loudly voicing 
its needs and demands, forcefully pressing for change, 
while caught in the vice of the harsh, hegemonic 
realities of the Super Power struggle. Few areas of 
the world are "depoliticized;" indeed, the 
constellation of forces at work in the system is 
replicated in the implications behind virtually every, 
new focus of trouble. Such an international system, 
it is submitted, is by definition inherently 
conflictuel.
of ... [th^ continued political independence and 
territorial integrity [of nation-state^ without any 
significant probability of becoming engaged in a ’war 
for survival'." (Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, 
"Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," 
World Politics, 16 [1964] , 390-391.)
^To wit: Argentina, India, Brazil, Pakistan. 
Conflicting reports exist concerning the stage of 
development of a nuclear bomb in these States; some 
deny that.they are in the process of developing one.
Yet many have been the efforts to work toward 
an improved context for the relations between the 
units of the system. For centuries man has striven 
to formalize patterns, invent schemes, refine methods, 
devise structures that would improve efficacy and 
efficiency in the many types of intercourse between 
the units of the system. Many of these endeavours 
had either stability, balance, order or peace as 
either their aim or their operational axis.
Indeed, efforts toward the prevention or 
resolution of conflict can be traced much further 
back in time than may be commonly assumed. Ancient 
Western and some Eastern civilizations sought to 
develop better methods for conducting relations 
among units of these systems by evolving early 
versions of diplomacy, law and international organizat­
ion. This is apparent, for example, in the Greek city- 
states, where alliances, truces, commercial treaties, 
and conferences were highly developed, as were
standards of arbitration, the treatment of aliens and
7the conduct of war. International law and 
organization have since then changed, grown, adapted 
and developed through the passage of time, the thought 
of men, the tumblings of history, the changing size 
and nature of the units of the system.
The present international system, characterized 
at once by inherently conflictuel forces, intense 
dynamics of change and the potentiality for global 
destruction, sees the need for the orderly and
7
Linda B. Miller, ed. ,' Dynamics' of' World 
Politics Studi'es' in' the' Resoluti'on' 'of Conflict 
(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice Kail, 1968), p. 4.
peaceful conduct of the relations between states as 
greater than ever. The prevention, management and 
resolution of conflict have become literally vital.
The need for a working system of authoritative rules 
for world order —  always important —  has assumed 
obvious urgency.
In light of such a scenario many questions 
come to mind. How can the key dynamics of conflict be 
isolated and understood in order to lay solid 
foundations for building a more stable, less 
conflictuel, viable international system ? How is 
one to analyze, understand and ultimately assess the 
effectiveness of existing methods and structures ?
Since international law is one of these, what role has 
it played in the face of conflict ? What has it 
contributed and in what ways ? Through what channels ? 
To what extent ?
The possible perspectives from which to 
attack this vast and complex matter range horizontally 
across many fields of study, and vertically through many 
possible levels of analysis. In turn, within each 
discipline and through the various possible levels of 
focus, there may be several aims toward which the 
analytical efforts may be directed.
Purpose' and approach
The focus of this enquiry concentrates on that 
development or sets of events on the continuum of 
conflict known as a crisis. An international crisis 
can be conceived as "a set of rapidly unfolding 
events which raises the impact of destabilizing forces 
in the general international system or any of its 
subsystems substantially above "normal" (i.e. average)
levels and increases the likelihood of violence
o
occurring in the system." Such an exclusively 
systemic perspective, however, while usefully 
stressing the destabilizing impact on the system, 
virtually ignores the very' sui' generis characteristics 
of crises and their effects on the decision-making 
unit. An understanding of crises and of the processes 
by which decision-makers deal with them must take 
into account, it is submitted, also sub-systemic 
dimensions. A more complete view thus would take 
into account that a crisis is also "a situation that 
1) threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making 
unit, 2) restricts the amount of time available for 
response before the decision is transformed, and 3) 
surprises the members of the decision-making unit by
9
its occurrence."
The chief purpose of this paper is to examine and 
to assess the role that international law may play in 
international political crises. It seems most helpful 
to conceive of law as
the conjunction of patterns of authority and 
patterns of control. Authority refers to 
expectations that an action is consistent with 
community beliefs about permissible decisions, 
decision-makers, and procedures.... Control refers 
to the degree to which community practices 
actually conform to expectations of authority or 
are sanctioned for deviation.10
It has been suggested that crises are
Oran R. Young,' The' Intermediaries :' Third 
Parties' in' International' Crisis (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1967), p. 10.
9
Charles F. Hermann, "International Crisis as 
a Situational Variable," in James N. Rosenau, ed., 
International' Politics and Foreign Poli'cy:' A Reader in 
Research and Tbeory, revised edition (New YorîFl The 
Free Press, 1969), p. 414.
^^John Norton Moore, Law and the Indo-China War
hardly representative of international behavior 
[for the fact that) they involved violations of 
law, or serious allegations of violation,' ipso 
■ facto, gives them special charactèr;H
and that
[i] t is the hardest test of international law, 
perhaps an unfair test, to ask whether and 
how it affected the decisions and acts of men 
who saw themselves as grappling with issues of 
national survival.12
These are legitimate observations. But the fact 
remains that in the present international system there 
is no room for complacency, and while the demands made 
on international law today are greater than ever, its 
vital task remains the moderation of state behavior in 
the interests of peaceful coexistence. As such, an 
assessment of its role during crises seems of 
commanding relevance.
Two case studies are examined: the Suez crisis 
of 1956 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, The 
enquiry will be approached from two different angles. 
At first, policy outcomes will be viewed from the 
legal perspective. Thus the analysis will focus on 
the international law invoked during the crises, the 
legal elements of the policies, the extent to which 
recourse to legal argument was sought, the channels 
through v/hich these actions were pursued. Second,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 12
^^Louis Henkin,' How Nations' BehaVe :' H'aW and 
Foreign' Poli'cy (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), 
p. 17 9. Hereinafter referred to as: Henkin,' Nations
1 9
Abram Chayes,' The' Cuban' Missi'le' Crisis. 
International Crises and the Role of Law (London : 
Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 1.
10
policy outcomes will be analyzed from the political 
perspective, with both systemic and sub-systemic 
levels considered.
These two levels of analysis, of course, represent
a major difference in approaches to the study of
13international politics. However, the dichotomization
is made here only in the interests of organization and 
analytical clarity. The author's approach follows the 
view that
a systemic treatment of actor objectives ... 
cannot help but [sic] straddle the fence by 
considering both levels of analysis in conjunction. 
While it is possible to evaluate the internal and 
external determinants of goal formulation in 
separate analytical operations, the synthetic 
quality of socio-political objectives, which rests 
co-equally on both the systemic and sub-systemic 
level, vitiates their analytically disjointed 
treatment. One cannot talk about goals without 
recognizing value preferences of the actors. At 
the same time the analyst must at least implicitly 
consider the external environment of the a c t o r . 14
Therefore, in a sense, one should look at this analytical 
process in "reverse". That is, while analyzing the 
given subject under enquiry —  whether through a "macro" 
or "micro" lens —  one should not lose sight of the 
fact that "levels" or "focuses," like theory itself, 
are useful but imperfect tools of analytical and 
organizational convenience. Thus"sytemic"and "sub-systemic" 
are in fact only focuses which tend to overcompartmentalize
13For an excellent treatment of this question 
see J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in 
International Relations," in Rosenau, pp. 20-2 9.
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the totality of an actually global, cumulative 
process. As Hanrieder notes, "the process of goal 
formulation necessarily draws on both a systemic and 
sub-systemic frame of reference, an actor's objective 
represents, in effect, a cumulative proposition."15 
In short, the most compelling reason for this approach 
"is the fact that this is precisely what the actors do 
themselves,"15
Third, after having considered, on the one hand, 
the legal arguments advanced by the States concerned 
(chapter three), and on the other hand, some of the 
political and other forces that influenced their 
policy outputs (chapter four), the analysis will turn 
to an examination of the role played by law (chapter 
five.)
The purpose here, however, is not meticulously 
to x-ray each case study with a view to identifying 
each and every instance where the law is seen to have 
had an impact. Although in chapter five the 
examination of the several roles of lav/ makes 
references to the crises, it is not intended to be 
exhaustive, and the reader may find in the studies yet 
other instances of the roles of law that have been 
suggested here. Thus the studies are seen rather more 
as devices which, providing the relatively firm 
ground of empiricism, serve as a heuristic springboard
^"^Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Actor Objectives and 
International Systems,"' Journal' of Politics, 27 (1965) ,
112.
•^^ Ib'id. , p. 116.
^^Ib'id. , p. 115.
12
for an enquiry on the manifold potentialities of law 
for the prevention, management and resolution of 
conflict.
In light of the dearth of available sources 
on the policy-making processes of the Soviet Union 
during the crises, this paper shall not deal with the 
determinants and aims of the foreign policy of that 
State.
CHAPTER II
THE CRISES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE BACKGROUND
AND OF THE EVENTS
Suez 1956
Setting and background of the Süez Canal: 
a sketch
The Compagnie Universelle' du Canal' Maritime' de 
Suez (Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal) 
was established pursuant to concessions by the Viceroy 
of Egypt in 1854 and 1856 and was responsible for the 
management, maintenance and expansion of the Canal.
The status of the Canal, which was completed in 1869, 
was established in a Convention of 1866 concluded 
between the Viceroy and the Company and ratified by 
Egypt's formal sovereign, the Sultan of Turkey. It 
was decided that these concessions were to last ninety- 
nine years (i.e. until 196 8) from the completion of 
the Canal, at which time the Egyptian government would 
take over and acquire control of the facility. The 
Company was to be compensated for equipment and moveable 
property only.
The 1856 Concessions provided,' inter' alia, that 
the Canal and its ports
shall be open for ever, as neutral passages, to 
every other merchant vessel crossing from one sea 
to the other, without any distinction, exclusion 
or preference with respect to persons or 
nationalities, in consideration of the payment of
13
14
the fees, and compliance with the regulations 
established by the universal company...
(Art. 14)1
It further stated that the Company "may not, in any 
case, give to any vessel, company, or private party 
any advantage not given to other vessels, companies, 
or private parties on the same terms."(Art. 15.) 
Article 18 granted Egypt fifteen per cent of the net 
profits.
The 18 6 6 Convention provided under Article
16 that:
In as much as the jcompan^ ... is Egyptian, it is 
governed by the laws and customs of the country; 
however, as regards its constitution as a 
corporation and the relations of its partners with 
one another, it is, by a special Convention, 
governed by the laws which, in France, govern joint 
stock companies. It is agreed that all disputes 
in this connection shall be settled in France... 
Disputes in Egypt between the Company and private 
individuals, whatever their nationality, shall be 
settled by the local courts... . Any disputes 
that may arise between the Egyptian government and 
the Company shall also be submitted to the local 
courts and settled according to the laws of the
country.2
The building of the Canal, however, had led 
Egypt to borrow 400 million francs (about $ 80 million 
at that time) and this debt, among others, was largely 
responsible for bankruptcy in 1876. Thus in 1875 Egypt 
sold its forty-four per cent holding to the British 
Government and in 1880 its right to fifteen per cent in
3
royalties went to a French investment syndicate.
Act of Concession of the Viceroy of Egypt, and 
Terms and Conditions for the Construction and Operation 
of the Suez Maritime Canal and Appurtenances. Signed at 
Alexandria, 5 January 1856, trans. United States Depart­
ment of State, The Suez Canal Problem: July 2 6 - September 
22, 1956 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1956), p. 7.
15
Questions pertaining to the use of the Canal 
by warships during wartime were soon to arise. VJhile 
no incidents occurred during the Franco-German War of 
1870 or the conflict between Russia and Turkey of 1877, 
the importance of settling the status of the Canal in 
this respect had become obvious. After years of 
negotiation agreement was reached in the Convention of 
1888, which remains today the document that governs 
the status of the Canal.
Article 1 of the Convention provides that the 
"Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war 
as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of 
war, without distinction of flag." In Article 2 "[t]he 
High Contracting Parties ... undertake not to interfere 
in any way with security of that Canal and its 
branches" and they agree "that no right of war, act of 
hostility or act having for its purpose to interfere 
with the free navigation of the Canal shall be committed 
in the Canal."(Art. 4.) Article 9 further provides 
that " [t^ he Egyptian Government shall . . . take the 
necessary measures for enforcing the execution of the 
Convention."^
2
Convention between the Viceroy of Egypt and the 
Compagnie Universelle d u . Canal Maritime de Suez.
Signed at Cairo, 22 February 1866, in’ ibid., p. 15. 
Hereinafter referred to as "1866 Convention."
^Kennett Love,' Suez The' Twi'ce'-Fought' 'V'Tar (New 
York, Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1969), p. 156.
^Convention between Great Britain, Austria - Hungary, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain 
and Turkey, Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez 
Maritime Canal. Signed at Constantinople, 2 9 October 
1888, in Department of State, p. 17, p. 19. Hereinafter 
referred to as "1888 Convention."
16
The Canal had shifted the focus of British 
interest in the Middle East from Constantinople to 
Egypt.^  By 1875, it will be recalled, the United 
Kingdom owned forty-four per cent of the Company shares 
and by 1882 it had stationed troops in Egypt to ensure 
physical control of the Canal. In 1914 the United 
Kingdom unilaterally declared Egypt its protectorate 
and by 1922, having granted independence to Egypt, it 
assumed responsibility for the defence of its territory 
and of the Canal. This situation was formalized in 
1936 by a new treaty whereby the United Kingdom would 
keep troops in the Canal Zone until such time when 
Egypt could defend it itself.
In 194 8, during the Arab-Israeli war, Egypt 
through its search-and-seizure tactics effectively 
closed the Canal to Israeli ships and to all Israeli- 
bound cargo. It continued to follow this policy also 
after the 1949 Armistice, on the grounds that a state 
of war still existed.
In May 1950 the United States, the United 
Kingdom and France signed the Tripartite Declaration.
This document, which was not a treaty and had no 
binding power, inter alia expressed the Big Three's 
opposition to the use or threat of force by the Middle 
Eastern States, stated their intention to act immediately 
to prevent the violation of the 194 9 armistice lines,^ 
and to take common counsel in the event of such a 
violation, and further, it established their agreement
7
to balance any supply of arms to the two sides.
^Love, pp. 167-168.
•^Tbid ; p. 70.
7Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1967), pp. 13-14.
17
In 1951 the Security Council of the United 
Nations called for a resumption of free navigation in 
the area for Israeli ships and cargo, but it met with 
Egypt's rejection, A similar attempt by the same 
body in 1954 was blocked by the Soviet Union, though 
Egypt proceeded to relax somewhat its restrictions.
In October of the same year the United Kingdom 
signed a treaty with Egypt providing for the former's
Q
withdrawal of all its troops by June 1956, Under 
this treaty the United Kingdom was allowed to return its 
military forces in the case of armed attack by a power 
(other than Israel) on any member of the Arab League or 
Turkey (Article 4). Under Article 8 the Parties 
reaffirmed that the Canal was "an integral part of 
Egypt" and "express [ed]the determination to uphold 
the Convention [of 188^ guaranteeing the freedom of 
navigation of the Canal," Dynamics of change were 
already present in this scenario, however. As late as 
June 1956 the Egyptian Government seemed to accept 
the due continuance of the Concession until 1968, but
9
were not contemplating its extension beyond that date.
Britain had had a long association with the 
Middle East, through times both of war and peace, 
beginning with the gradual collapse of the Turkish 
Empire, Its commercial interests, in particular, 
were significant. The area was a key source of oil for 
Britain and for Western Europe. The military base at
g
Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Egyptian Government Regarding the Suez Canal Base,
Signed at Cairo, 19 October 1954, in Department of State, 
pp.21-22. Hereinafter referred to as "1954 Agreement."
^Robert R. Bowie, Suez 1956, International Crises 
and the Role of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 
1974), p. 6.
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Ismailia, in Egypt, was an important outpost, which 
even after it was vacated in 1956 was kept in operat­
ional readiness and held £40-50 million worth of 
10stores. Then, of course, there was the Canal.
In the four years between 1951 and 1955, total
tonnage passing through the canal rose almost fifty
per cent, exceeding 207 million tons in 1955, with more
than 8 7 million tons moving from south to north. Some
67 million tons were Middle East oil, which provided
about one half of Europe's oil needs, with the United
Kingdom receiving 20,5 million tons, France 12.1 million
tons, Italy and the Netherlands 7,3 million each. Oil
for the United States amounted to 8,6 million tons.
Agricultural products and minerals and metals also
flowed north through the Canal. The southbound traffic
included large quantities of manufactured machinery,
11metal products, railway equipment,.etc.
The' Nationalization' of' the' Canal Company
Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser had been brought to 
the presidency of Egypt by the officers * coup that had 
overthrown King Farouk in 1952, and had gained a central 
position in Middle East politics. The year 1955 is
12considered a turning point in Israeli-Egyptian relations.
In February of that year Israel launched an unusually
destructive raid in the Egyptian village of Gaza, Nasser,
who had been canvassing for arms in the United States for
some time, intensified his efforts and requested $ 2 7
13million worth of arms to that country.
^^Thomas, p, 32,
^^D,C, Watt,' Britain' and' t'he' 'S'u'e z Can'al : The 
Background (London: R.I.I.A,, 1956), pp. 9, 13-14, 20-21,
12Love, chap. 4; Bowie, p, 10,
^^Thomas, p. 14.
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His request was turned down. In order to counter 
Israeli raids effectively, Nasser needed guerilla- 
type forces. He thus proceeded to recruit Palestinian 
Arabs to organize fedayeen^^ retaliatory units, which 
went into action in August of that year and at the 
outset apparently numbered about 700 men.^^
In June 1955, after a final, unsuccessful appeal 
for arms to the United States, Egypt began negotiations 
with the Soviet Union. Secret deliveries of arms began 
in July and orders were placed for Stalin tanks, MiG's 
and Ilyushins, and Czech r i f l e s . T h e  Russo-Egyptian 
arms Agreement was made public on 27 September. On 19 
October Egypt announced the establishment of a joint 
Egyptian-Syrian military command.
These developments alarmed Israel, which became 
ever more determined to wage "preventive war." In 
October Israel's Minister of Defence and nation-builder, 
David Ben-Gurion, instructed the Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General Moshe Dayan, "among other things ... to 
be prepared to capture the Straits of Tiran ... in order 
to ensure freedom of shipping through the Gulf of Akaba 
and the Red Sea,
In December 1955 the United States and Britain, 
together with the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (I.B.R.D.), offered to help finance the 
foreign exchange costs of Nasser's ambitious project.
14This Muslim word refers to those, among the 
faithful, willing to sacrifice everything for their 
cause. (Love, p. 84.)
' ^^Tbid; p. 86.
16Thomas, p. 15.
1 1 7
Moshe Dayan,' Diary 'of' 'the' Sin'ai' Campaign (London 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 12.
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the construction of the High Dam on the Nile, near 
1 8Aswan. The cost of the project, the largest of
its kind in history, was to be $ 13 billion and
19required twelve to fifteen years for completion.
The extent of financing initially under consideration
included loans and grants of $ 56 million from the
United States, $ 14 million from the United Kingdom
and $ 200 million from the I.B.R.D. Egypt was to
20provide $ 800 million or more. Negotiations
continued for several months, as Nasser found 
unacceptable the budgetary controls and safeguards 
that the I.B.R.D. included as terms of the deal.
In May Nasser recognized Communist China. One
month later the Soviet Foreign Minister, Shepilov, who
was in Egypt during the celebrations for the British
withdrawal of troops, appeared amidst a large display
21of arms from Communist countries. .
During this period United States President 
Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles, began to reassess the Aswan deal under a 
different light. Eventually they decided against it. 
More than one factor seems to have contributed to this 
decision, taken as it was against the background of 
several recent developments. There had been Egypt's
18It bears clarifying that the Aswan High Dam, or 
simply the High Dam, should not be confused with the 
Aswan Dam (a frequent misnomer.) The latter is a 
much smaller structure, built by the British at the 
turn of the century. (Love, p. 300.)
1 9
Bowie, p. 11.
20Tbid.
^^Thomas, p. 22.
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recognition of Red China, the arms deal with the
Soviet Union, signs of intensified relations with
22countries of the Communist Bloc, Nasser's
unrelenting "counter-proposals” to I.B.R.D. terms
and the inherently very risky nature of such a large
financial venture, particularly in the light of
2 3doubts about the future solvency of Egypt. Not
least, there were domestic political questions of
seeking large appropriations from the Senate during an
election year, in the face of strongly opposing 
2 4lobbies and "in the critical climate towards
2 5neutralism then prevalent in Washington." It has
been suggested that some of these explanations "prove 
groundless" and that "all the available evidence 
points to Nasser's recognition of Red China as the 
event that beclouded Dulles's thinking about Nasser.
Whatever the crucial reason(s), the final
American statement came on 19 July, 1956. Secretary
Dulles then notified the Egyptian Ambassador in
Washington, Ahmed Hussein, that the loan was cancelled.
In Britain, Sir Anthony Eden's government had reached
27a similar decision, apparently about the same time.
22Terence Robertson,' Crisis ; The' Inside' Story of' the 
Suez' Conspiracy (London: Hutchinson, 1965), p. 55.
23
Bowie, p. 12; Thomas, p. 22; Robertson, pp. 66-67.
2 4The Zionist and cotton lobbies were firmly 
opposed to the High Dam project (Love, p. 305); Bowie, 
p. 30; Anthony Nutting,' E'nd' Of' a Lesson : The Story of 
Suez (London: Constable, 1967), p. 4%1
2 5Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir 
Anthony Eden : Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 422.
^^Love, p. 315, p. 326.
^^"[r]he Government came to the conclusion that 
they could not go on with a project likely to be 
increasingly onerous in finance and unsatisfactory in 
practice." (Eden, p. 421.)
22
Their announcement came two days later. Nasser, who 
at the time was at Brioni, Yugoslavia, with Tito and 
Nehru, was deeply offended by the American action.
On 26 July, 1956 , one week after the
cancellation of the loan, Nasser proceeded to
nationalize the Suez Canal Company in the course of a
fiery, emotional three-hour speech at Alexandria,
This action, meant to "achieve true sovereignty, true
dignity and true pride" for Egypt, was clearly linked
by Nasser in his speech with the objective of collecting
2 8Canal dues for financing the High Dam project.
Nasser's decree issued Lav; No. 285 of 1956 on
the "Nationalization of the Universal Company of the
2 9Suez Maritime Canal." Through this instrument Egypt
took over all assets, rights and obligations of the 
Company, dissolved its administrative organs (Art. 1) 
and created " [a]n independent organization endowed 
with juristic personality and annexed to the Ministry 
of Commerce, ... jto[j take over the management of the 
Suez Canal Transit Service" (Art. 2). Compensation 
for Company shareholders was provided for at "the 
value of the shares shown in the closing quotations of 
the Paris Stock Exchange" on the preceding day, payable 
after Egypt had "taken delivery of all the assets and 
properties of the nationalized company" (Art. 1). 
Further, Article 4 stipulated that all Company employees 
were required to continue working; stiff penalties for 
violations of these provisions were set out in Article 5
2 8Speech by President Nasser, Alexandria, July 26, 
trans. American Embassy at Cairo, in Department of 
State, pp. 28-29.
2 9In' ibid., pp. 30-32, trans. American Embassy 
at Cairo.
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Developments following the nationalization
In April of 1955 Churchill resigned from the
office of Prime Minister and Anthony Eden took over.
Aged fifty-eight, no other man in British politics
at that time could have brought with him a more
impressive record as a diplomat and negotiator. Eden
enjoyed great authority and respect. Indeed, he could
dominate and dictate to his Cabinet more than even
Churchill had ever done and "in foreign affairs his word ,
was law." Eden was very much a man of his times: he
represented and for many he embodied British imperial
glories and aspirations, and the unwillingness to accept
the gradual but inevitable sunset of Empire. Yet the
realities of international politics made him "acutely
conscious and resentful of decline," especially in
31relation to the United States.
British reaction to the nationalization was one
of anger, great shock and grave concern. Slightly less
than a quarter of British imports came through the 
3 2canal; a third of the ships passing through it were 
33British. In 1956 the unhindered operation of the
waterway still remained crucial for the free flow of
oil and shipping. Indeed, most of Britain's oil (and
half of that used by Europe) came through the Canal.
3 5Bismarck had called the Canal "the world's neck," and 
for the United Kingdom it remained a veritable "lifeline." 
Consequently, "the Egyptian" —  Eden had said —  "could 
not be allowed to have his thumb on our windpipe.
^^Thomas, p. 34.
31 Tbid., p. 36; see also Robertson, p. 79, p. 81.
32President of Board of Trade on first nine months 
of 1956 (Parliamentary Debates [commons], 5th Series, vol. 
560, col. 1112), in Thomas, p. 31.
Times (London), 27 , 28 July 1956 , in Thomas, p. 36; 
Eden, p. 42 6.
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Thus on 2 7 July an ' ’ad 'hoc Cabinet committee,
known as the "Suez Committee," was set up to deal with
the crisis. Its members were: Eden; Lloyd, the
Foreign Secretary; MacMillan, the Chancellor; Lennox-
Boyd, Colonial Secretary; Salisbury, Lord President;
Kilmuir; Thorneycroft, President of the Board of Trade;
37and Watkinson, Monckton and Home, who often attended. 
Following a meeting that morning, Eden came to the 
conclusion that Britain's
essential interests in this area must be safeguarded, 
if necessary by military action, and that the 
needful preparations must be made. Failure to 
keep the canal international would inevitably lead 
to the loss one by one of all our interests and 
assets in the Middle East, and even if her Majesty's 
government had to act alone they could not stop 
short of using force to protect their position.
This was our recorded o p i n i o n . 38
That evening he sent President Eisenhower a telegram 
echoing that opinion:
my cabinet colleages and Chiefs of Staff ... are all 
agreed that we cannot afford to allow Nasser to 
sieze control of the canal in this way .... My 
colleagues and I are convinced that we must be ready, 
in the last .resort, to use force to bring Nasser to 
his senses ... I have this morning instructed our 
Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military plan 
accordingly.39
This was not sabre-rattling, as events would in time
confirm.
34Thomas, p. 11.
^^In Love, p. 361.
^^Eden, p. 42 6; Thomas, p. 31.
^^Thomas, pp. 40-41.
^^Eden, p. 4 26.
39■^ •^ Tbid., pp. 427-428.
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In France the government was headed by Prime 
Minister Guy Mollet, who had been elected with Radical 
support in January of that year, A former hero of 
the Resistance, he had been Secretary of the French 
Socialist Party since 1946.
French reaction to the nationalization also was 
one of shock and indignation. Aside from the 
implications for oil supplies and shipping, the canal 
in many ways was part of French life. France had 
conceived and built it, the very headquarters of the 
Compagnie were in Paris and French shareholders were in 
the m a j o r i t y . M o r e o v e r ,  for French public opinion 
Nasser and the Algerian rebels were inextricably linked 
and as such, he was regarded as a public enemy.
American reaction stemmed from a different 
economic, political and psychological environment. Only 
fifteen per cent of American imports came through the 
Canal and American investment in it was negligible. 
Further, while the alternative route to Europe around 
the Cape was two-thirds longer, it was only two-fifths 
longer to North A m e r i c a . M o r e o v e r ,  it was election 
year in the United States and Dwight D. Eisenhower was 
standing for re-election as the "Prince of Peace."
On 31 July the President answered Eden's 
telegram in a letter where he conveyed his "personal 
conviction, as well as that of my associates as to the 
unwisdom even of contemplating the use of ;.. force at
About 4 8 per cent of the French oil supply came 
through the Canal; some 80,000 French investors held 
about half the shares of the Canal Company (Bowie, p. 26.)
41
^-^T b r d .
•^^ Tbid, , p. 49.
^^Dwight b, Eisenhower,' The' White' House' Years :
Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (London: Heinemann, 1966), pp. 664 
665 .
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this moment ... I hope you will consent to reviewing 
this matter once more in its broadest aspects.
The Eighteen-Power proposal
On 31 July the United Kingdom, France and the 
United States met in London to discuss the recent 
events. At the Conference Dulles sympathized with 
Eden (Nasser must be made "to disgorge" he had said)^^ 
but strongly discouraged the use of force. By the 
close of the talks the Big Three agreed to meet in London 
again on 16 August for a conference where the twenty- 
four concerned maritime powers (including Egypt) would 
be invited.
However, apparently on this same day the British 
Cabinet had formulated a major decision: "while a
negotiated settlement should be sought, force would be
4 5used if negotiations failed within a measurable time." 
Similar action on the French side appears to have been 
taken about this time.
At the second London Conference eighteen out of 
twenty-two countries (Egypt refused to attend) supported 
a scheme for a board of user nations. This Eighteen- 
Power Proposal, as it came to be known, had the full 
backing of Dulles, and sought a new convention based 
on the following arrangement:
1. A Suez Canal Board, composed of the users and 
Egypt, with authority to manage and develop 
the Canal,
2, An Arbitral Commission to settle disputes.
44Eden, p . 4 37.
4 5Thomas, p. 55.
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3. Effective sanctions for any violation of the 
governing Convention of 1888.46
The Eighteen (who represented over ninety per 
cent of Canal traffic)appointed a committee headed 
by Sir Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia. 
Menzies was entrusted the mandate of explaining to 
Nasser the purposes and objectives of the proposal and 
of finding out if he would be willing to negotiate a 
convention on the basis of it. Nasser rejected the 
proposal, asserting that operation by an international 
board would remove the Canal from Egyptian control and 
usurp Egyptian sovereignty. He let it be known, however, 
that he was willing to assure freedom of navigation by 
revising and reaffirming the Convention of 1888 and to 
conclude binding agreements regarding tolls and the 
development of the Canal.
Anglo-French military preparations
Anglo-French military preparations had by now
gone far: for instance , three British aircraft
carriers and vessels of the French fleet were on their
way to the East Mediterranean.^^ A joint team of
4 9Anglo-French military planners had been appointed, 
with instructions to "be prepared to mount joint 
operations against Egypt to restore the Suez Canal to 
international control," The operation was given the 
code name "Musketeer." The military and organizational
Bowie, p. 39.
Ibid., p. 40.
4 8Thomas, p. 65.
49General Sir Charles Keightley, Supreme Commander; 
Vice-Admiral Barjot. Deputy Supreme Commander.
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problems were immense and were described by the Chiefs
of Staff as being harder than "Overlord" in Normandy 
50in 1944, Moreover, Britain was revealed to be in an
appalling state of military unreadiness and no action
51could have been taken before at least six weeks.
The Suez Canal Users' Association
To introduce an alternative proposal, on 4 
September Dulles suggested the formation of a Suez 
Canal Users' Association (S,C,U,A.), Its rationale lay 
in the idea that since the Convention of 1888 entitled 
the user States to avail themselves of the Canal, they 
could come together to form a "co-operative" to exercise 
their rights under the Convention, Organized in such a 
group, they could operate the Canal and represent the 
users vis-à-vis Egypt,
The details of the S,C,U,A. plan reached London
on 10 September, Tv70 days later Eden presented Dulles's
idea before Parliament, implying that the plan would
be backed by force if necessary. The same day
the United Kingdom and France brought the Suez dispute
to the attention of the Security Council. In their
letter the two Powers suggested that Egypt's rejection of
the Eighteen-Power Proposal constituted an "aggravation
of the situation which, if allowed to continue, would
5 2constitute a manifest danger to peace and security."
The following day Dulles provided Eden's anti­
climax. In a Press conference he stressed that the 
envisaged Users' Association would seek co-operation with
^^Tbid., p, 66-68.
^^Robertson, p. 76.
52U,N, SCOR, 11th Year, Supplement for July, 
August and September, 1956, Doc. S/3645, 12 September 
1956, pp. 28-29.
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Egypt within the ambit of the 1888 Convention, that it 
sought to impose no regime on Egypt and that, were 
that country to prevent passage, the United States 
would divert its ships around the Cape and would not use 
force. Thus in the eyes of Britain and France Dulles 
had effectively removed any "teeth" from the plan.
This episode further aggravated the existing antipathy 
between Eden and Dulles.
On 15 September Nasser denounced S.C.U.A. in a
speech decrying imperialism and foreign domination.
The following day Nasser triumphantly operated the
Canal with his own Egyptian pilots, aided by newly
recruited foreign trainees. Two-hundred and fifty-four
53ships were passed within a week: Nasser had
demonstrated that, claims to the contrary, Company pilots 
were not indispensable and that Egypt was fully capable 
of assuring freedom of navigation as required by the 
terms of the 1888 Convention.
From 19 to 22 September the Eighteen States met 
for the second London Conference. While consensus 
existed on the desirability of S.C.U.A,, the meeting 
produced no concrete results, as it was unable to 
resolve the existing divergences.
On 23 September Eden and Mollet referred the 
Suez dispute to the Security Council. In their draft 
resolution they
1) Asserted the necessity for safeguards for the 
users'rights under the Convention of 18 88;
2) endorsed the Eighteen-Power Proposal as a suitable 
solution ;
53Love, pp. 422-4 24; Thomas, pp. 82-83.
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3) urged Egypt to negotiate a system for the 
Canal on that basis;
4) urged Egypt to co-operate with S.C.U.A. pending 
permanent settlement.54
Israeli military preparations
Meantime in Israel, Ben-Gurion for nearly one
year had been nurturing the idea of waging preventive
war on Egypt. Israel had been receiving arms from France
possibly since early August and had known of Operation
55Musketeer as early as 1 September. Apparently Ben-
Gurion, who was again the Prime Minister, had already 
been told that if he wanted full support from France, 
Israel would have to attack Egypt at a set. date.
The date was to be close to 6 November, the day of the 
American elections, so that the United States would not 
be able to react.
The Six Principles
On 5 October the Security Council considered the 
Suez dispute and the Anglo-French Draft Resolution.
Talks continued in private session from 9 to 12 
October. During this period the British, French and 
Egyptian Foreign Ministers (Lloyd, Pineau and Fawzi, 
respectively) also discussed the matter privately, with 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold present at the 
meetings. Certain points of agreement emerged from the 
talks which, distilled by Lloyd, were formulated by 
Hammarskjold as six principles which should be the 
basis for a settlement. They were as follows:
54U.N. SCOR, 11th Year, 734th Meeting, 26 September 
1956, pp. 1-22, in Bowie, p. 47.
S^ibid., p. 86.
^^Ibid., p. 87.
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a) There should be free and open transit through 
the canal without discrimination, overt or 
covert”" this covers both political and 
technical aspects;
b) The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;
c) The operation of the Canal should be insulated 
from the politics of any country;
d) The manner of fixing tolls and charges should 
be decided by agreement between Egypt and 
the users;
e) A fair proportion of dues should be allotted 
to development;
f) In case of disputes, unresolved affairs 
between the Universal Maritime Canal Company 
and the Egyptian Government should be settled 
by arbitration, with suitable terms of 
reference and suitable provisions for the 
payment of sums found to be due.57
The parties adjourned with the understanding that they 
would meet in Geneva later in the month.
On 13 October the Security Council entertained 
the revised Anglo-French Draft Resolution, which in its 
first section espoused the Six Principles but was 
followed by a second section seemingly oblivious of 
the private talks and of the common ground that had 
emerged. It seemed designed to alienate the 
Egyptians. It insisted upon the Eighteen-Power 
Proposal (which had long been rejected by Nasser), it 
noted Egypt's failure to submit "sufficiently precise 
proposals to meet the requirements" (i.e. the Six 
Principles) and prompted co-operation with S.C.U.A. 
(which also was known to be unacceptable to Nasser.)^^ 
The Security Council unanimously adopted the first 
section of the Resolution but the second, approved nine
57U.N. SCOR, 11th Year, Supplement for October, 
November and December 1956, Doc. S/3671, 13 October 
1956, pp. 19-20.
5 8
Ibid., Doc. S/3675, 13 October 1956, pp. 47-48.
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to two, was vetoed by the Soviet Union,
The Sevres accord
On 16 October Eden and Mollet met in Paris and,
following to previous conversations, apparently
decided to mount their military operation jointly with 
59Israel. On 23 October Mollet and Ben-Gurion met
secretly at Sèvres, a suburb of Paris, to confirm the 
Franco-Israeliside of the plan. It included French 
naval protection of the Israeli coast, French aerial 
cover of Israeli cities and French parachute drops of 
food and supplies to the advancing Israeli forces.
They were joined that evening by the British represent­
ative.^^ Sometime between 24 and 2 5 October they 
concluded the' entente, the outcome of which was:
- Israel would attack on 2 9 October;
- Israel would advance as if to threaten the Canal;
- Great Britain and France, feigning to act with 
the purpose of protecting the^.Canai and' separating 
the combatants, would issue an ultimatum to 
Israel and Egypt, urging them to withdraw to 
within ten miles from the Canal, and requesting 
Egypt to accept temporary occupation of Canal 
sites by Britain and France;
- Israel would accept the ultimatum;
- Egypt, predictably, would reject it and thus 
provide Britain and France with the' c'a'sus' b'e'lTi to 
bomb Egypt and destroy its air force;
- France would veto any resolution in the Security 
Council that would brand Israel an aggressor;
- Britain and France would begin to land forces g2 
on 6 November, the day of the American elections.
The British Cabinet approved the plan on 25
October.
5 9Thomas, pp. 106-107; Robertson, p. 150; Love, 
pp. 452-4 53.
^^Thomas, p. 113.
^^Apparently it was Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign 
Secretary (ibid.)
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Resort' to' force
In the afternoon of 29 October the Israelis 
attacked: 395 paratroops dropped at Mitla Pass and
began their offensive, creating a military threat 
to the Canal, as required by the agreement.
Twenty-four hours later Britain and France sent 
ultimatums to the Israeli and Egyptian Ambassadors, with 
the message that had been agreed upon at Sevres.
Israel, of course, accepted the ultimatum; Egypt, as 
predicted, refused it.
The Security Council was called in emergency 
session to consider the Israeli attack and to vote on a 
United States Draft Resolution calling for Israel's 
withdrawal and for all States to refrain from the use of 
force. Though supported by seven votes to two, with 
two abstentions, the Resolution was vetoed by the United 
Kingdom and France.
In the early morning hours of 31 October General 
Keightley gave the orders for the Anglo-French armada 
to set off from Malta, Algiers and Southampton toward 
its Port Said objective. At dusk on the same day 2 40 
allied aircraft began their forty-eight hour offensive 
against Egyptian airfields.
^^Bowie, p. 59; Love, pp. 4 64-466; Thomas, pp. 113- 
114; Robertson, pp. 155-162.
^^Dayan, p. 77, For an account of the military 
operations see,' ih'ter' alia, Dayan; Andre Beaufre,' The 
Suez' Expedition : T9'5 6 (New York: Praeger, 19 69) ; Samuel 
L.A. Marshall,' S'ihai' 'Victory (New York: Morrow, 1958) .
G^Ibid., p. 99.
34
In order to block the Canal, Nasser ordered ships 
filled with concrete to be sunk in it, and in view of 
the expected sea-borne invasion, he decided to withdraw 
his troops from Sinai and concentrate defenses around 
Cairo. On the night between 31 October and 1
November the Israelis took Gaza and captured thousands 
of prisoners.
The United Nations and the creation of the Emergency 
Force.
Deadlocked over the Anglo-French veto, the 
Security Council decided to invoke the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution and thus transfer the Suez problem to 
the General A s s e m b l y . O n  1 November the United 
States presented its Draft Resolution to the Assembly, 
calling for,' inter' alia, an immediate cease fire.^^
It was approved by sixty-four votes to five, the United 
Kingdom and France abstaining.
Subsequent to the vote, Lester Bowles Pearson, 
Canadian Minister for External Affairs, proceededrto 
explain Canada's abstention. He stressed the necessity 
for "action, not only to end the fightihg but to make 
the peace." Finally, he advanced a proposal requesting 
that the Secretary-General be authorized "to make 
arrangements with Member States for a United Nations 
force large enough to keep these borders at peace
69
while a political settlement is being worked out."
^^Thomas, p. 130.
•^^Tbid. , p. 132.
^^U.N. SCOR, 11th Year, Supplement for October, 
November and December 1956, Doc. S/3721, 31 October 1956, 
pp. 116-117.
^^U.N. GAOR, First Emergency Special Session, 561st 
Meeting, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/3256. The Draft 
Resolution became General Assembly Resolution (ES-1) 2 
November 1956.
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Lester Pearson's proposal was the germ of 
what was to become the United Nations Emergency Force 
(U.N.E.F.). In the event, Pearson managed to 
persuade an understandably skeptical Hammarskjold of 
the workability of the suggestion. On 3 November 
Pearson presented a Draft Resolution requesting the 
Secretary-General to submit a plan within forty-eight 
hours for the establishment of an international 
emergency force "with the consent of the nations 
concerned" in order to "secure and supervise the 
cessation of hostilities in accordance with' 'all the 
terms" of Resolution 997 (ES-1). The Assembly adopted
it by a vote of fifty-seven to naught, with nineteen 
abstentions, and became Resolution 998 (ES-1).
I
On 4 November, while Egyptian airfields were
under heavy a t t a c k , t h e  Assembly had approved
Resolution 1000 which established U.N.E.F. and
excluded from participation in it any of the Permanent
Members of the Security Council. However, the war;
seemed to be gathering, and not losing, momentum:
at dawn on 5 November 600 British and 4 87 French
71paratroops were dropped outside Port.Said.
6 9U.N. GAOR, First Emergency Special Session, 562nd 
Meeting, 1 November 1956.
70The level of activity was high: aircraft were 
taking off and landing at the Cyprus staging base at a 
rate of one per minute, and one every two or three 
minutes on the carriers (Thomas, p. 135.)
Ibid. , p. 14.
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The situation was thus becoming more and more 
pressing, the latest developments underscoring the 
immediate need of a working force. Pearson and 
Hammarskjold, aided by the Secretary-General's 
assistants Cordier and Bunche, began to work 
feverishly in order to define U.N.E.F.'s mandate before 
the arrival of the sea-borne invasion. Early on 6 
November Hammarskjold could finally cable the terms of 
reference for U.N.E.F. The key provisions were:
1. The force was by no means an enforcement body.
2. Host-country consent was a conditio' sine' 'qua' non
3. The force was to be politically neutral and not 
a diplomatic instrument to enhance the 
bargaining position of the invading Powers.
When the Secretary-General’s cable arrived, however, 
the armada already was off Port Said (the French landed 
at Port Fuad.) Both these objectives were captured in 
the course of the day.
The' Cease Tire
However, at noon on 6 November, in the face of 
mounting economic sanctions as well as international 
and domestic political pressures. Prime Minister Eden 
capitulated. The French followed suit, having decided 
that they would not carry on alone. Thus the United 
Kingdom and France notified the Secretary-General that 
their forces would cease fire at midnight GMT. That 
day British patrols had reached as far as Fayid, twenty- 
five miles short of Suez, but the main force remained 
seventy-five miles away from Suez when the Government
72Asset out in the Secretary-General's Second and 
Final Report to the General Assembly pursuant to 
Resolution 998.
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7 3ordered the cease fire. On the night of 6 November
the Anglo-French forces halted.
On 7 November the General Assembly approved 
Hammarskjold's guidelines for U.N.E.F. General E.L.M, 
Burns of Canada was appointed Commander of the Force.
Many difficulties loomed ahead, however. Nasser, 
concerned about Egypt's sovereignty, was fearful that 
U.N.E.F. might become an Anglo-French instrument to 
internationalize the Canal, or that the Force would in 
fact take the place and role of the invading Powers.
The United Kingdom and France, on the other hand, were 
reluctant to let go of their grip on the occupied area 
before a policy on the administration of the Canal that 
was suitable to them, could be reached.
Neither Eisenhower nor Hammarskjold, however, 
shared this view and approach, as they both felt that 
any policy should be worked out after a restoration of 
the' staths' 'quo' ante. Finally, Britain and France 
yielded to the increasing pressures and agreed to 
withdraw. This was achieved only after Pearson and 
Hammarskjold devised a scheme of a series of conditional 
and interlocking commitments that effectively broke 
the impasse that had developed.
On 3 November the Secretary- General received 
Notes from the United Kingdom and France announcing 
their decision to withdraw completely (token withdrawals 
had taken place earlier,). Accordingly General Burns 
was instructed to oversee the evacuation, which was 
completed by 22 December, 195 6 . Clearance operations of 
the Canal were undertaken immediately and were complete 
by 8 April, 1957 .
^Thomas, p. 14 4.
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\qien the Israelis had stopped fighting on 4 November 
they controlled most of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza 
Strip and the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. 
Predictably, Israel was not inclined easily to 
relinquish these areas, which were of enormous 
strategic i m p o r t a n c e . G a z a  afforded Israel control 
over the fedayeen bases, and control of Sharm el-Sheikh 
and the Straits of Tiran made it possible for shipping 
to transit the Gulf of Aqaba (with its port at Eilat) 
via the shorter route by way of the Persian Gulf, thus 
bypassing the Suez Canal.
The question of Israel's withdrawal soon 
reached a deadlock. Israel demanded that U.N.E.F. 
guarantee freedom of navigation and an end to fedayeen 
raids. Hammarskjold persevered in his approach of 
return to the status' quo' ante as a precondition to 
negotiation. After considerable discussion by the 
Assembly and the diplomatic efforts of the Secretary- 
General-, after four months of negotiation a common 
ground was found. The General Assembly passed 
Resolution 1125 (XI) which effectively asserted 
Hammarskjold’s approach that only a return to the 
Armistice lines could be conducive to a Middle East 
environment in which peace could be built. United 
Nations forces were assigned the supervision of the 
Armistice boundaries. Eventually, and particularly 
in the face of pressure from the United States, Israel 
yielded, withdrawing on 7 March, 1957. U.N.E.F.'s 
takeover, under General Burns, was complete by 
8 March.
^^See chapter four.
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Epilogue
In the following days Hammarskjold worked 
out with Nasser a' modus' vivendi in order for U.N.E.F 
to remain in Gaza and at the Gulf of Aqaba without 
the presence of Egyptian troops. After further 
negotiations, on 24 April, 1957 Egypt communicated to 
the Secretary-General the framework for the 
administration and operation of the Canal. In its 
Declaration Egypt stated:
1. Egypt repeated its resolve to "respect the 
terms and spirit of the Constantinople 
Convention of 1888."
2. Tolls would be fixed at the Company level, and 
would not be increased (by more than one per 
cent a year) except by agreement or 
arbitration.
3. "The Canal would be operated ... by the 
autonomous Suez Canal Authority established by 
the Government of Egypt on 26 July 1956."
Egypt would welcome co-operation between the 
Authority and representatives of shipping and 
trade.
4. Egypt proposed international arbitration of 
complaints of discrimination or other violations 
of the Canal code.
5. Disputes over the meaning of the Constantinople 
Convention of 1888 would be referred to the 
International Court of Justice. Egypt would 
accept compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 
under Article 36 of its statute.
6. The Canal would be maintained and developed 
according to the programme previously 
established by the Company. Twenty-five per cent 
of the gross receipts of the Canal would be 
deposited in a fund to be used to develop the 
Canal.
7. Changes in the regulations could be challenged 
and submitted to an international arbitral 
tribunal.75
7 5U.N. GAOR, Supplements, 12th Session, 1-4, 
Doc. A/3574, 24 April 1957 (Bowie, p. 97.)
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Cuba 1962
During the months of July and August of 1962, 
United States intelligence reports noted a sharp increase 
in maritime traffic between the Soviet Union and Cuba. 
Many Soviet ships had unloaded in Cuba large cargoes 
of transportation, electronic and construction 
equipment. These reports also suggested that some 
3,000 to 5,000 Soviet military technicians had arrived 
to the i s l a n d . O n  29 August an American U-2 aircraft 
had produced photographic evidence that surface-to-air 
missiles (SAM's) had been installed on the island.
On 2 September the Soviet Union announced that 
it had been supplying Cuba with armaments and 
technicians, following requests for aid from that 
country. On 4 September Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman 
of the Soviet Council of Ministers and First Secretary 
of the Communist Party, sent his Ambassador in 
Washington, Anatoly F . Dobrynin, to call on Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy. During the meeting the Attorney 
General expressed American concern about the extent of 
the arms build-up in Cuba. Dobrynin replied that this 
military build-up was not of any significance, that no 
ground-to-ground missiles or other offensive weapons 
would have been placed in Cuba and that Chairman
^^Elie Abel,' The' Missil'es' of October:' The' Story of 
'the' Cuban' Missl'ie Cris'is' 1'962 (London :MacGibbon & Kee , 
1966), p. 20.
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Khrushchev did not wish politically to embarrass the 
American President, particularly during the period 
prior to an election.
Following this meeting, President John F.
Kennedy issued a statement warning the Soviet Union
against introducing offensive ground-to-ground missiles
into Cuba, indicating the grave consequences that
would arise from such an action. On 7 September Kennedy
requested —  and obtained —  Congressional authorization
to call up 150,000 reserve troops. On 11 September the
Kremlin reiterated its assurances, asserting that it
did not intend "to shift its weapons for the repulsion
of agression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other
7 7country, for instance Cuba."
On the morning of 16 October President Kennedy 
called an extraordinary meeting of certain M 
ministers and advisers to consider a new disturbing 
development. At the meeting, representatives from the 
Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) proceeded to 
introduce new photographic evidence showing that 
offensive missile sites were being constructed in Cuba. 
The startling news, in direct clash with the recent 
Soviet reassurances, had most alarming implications for 
American security, and the officials immediately began 
discussions. This group, which later came to be known 
as the Executive Committee of the National Security 
Council (or "Ex-Comm"), had the following members, 
nearly all of whom met regularly during the course of 
the crisis:
^-^Tbid. , p. 23.
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President John F. Kennedy
Robert Kennedy
Dean Rusk
Robert McNamara
John McCone
Douglas Dillon
MeGeorge Bundy
Theodore C. Sorensen 
George Ball
General Maxwell Taylor
Edward Martin
Llewellyn Thompson 
Roswell Gilpatric 
Paul Nitze
Attorney General 
Secretary of State 
Secretary of Defense 
Director of the C.I.A, 
Secretary of the Treasury 
Presidential Adviser on 
national-security affairs 
Presidential counsel 
Under Secretary of State 
Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff 
Assistant Secretary of 
State for Latin America 
Adviser on Russian Affairs 
Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Assistant Secretary of 
Defense
Charles Bohlen occupied Llewellyn Thompson's position 
for the first day; intermittently, the following also 
were present at various meetings:
Vice-President Lyndon B . Johnson
Adlai Stevenson 
Kenneth O'Donnell 
Donald Wilson
: Ambassador to the United 
Nations 
: Special Assistant to the 
President 
: Deputy Director of the 
United States Information 
Agency (U.S.I.A.)78
In meetings held later that day, the group 
began to discuss the entire spectrum of possible 
alternatives. President Kennedy made two preliminary 
decisions. One was to order an increase in the number 
of U-2 photo-reconnaissance flights over Cuba; the 
other was not to disclose these developments at this 
time.
On Wednesday 17 October the United States 
Intelligence Board reported that about twenty-eight
78Robert F. Kennedy,' Thirteen Da~ys: The Cuban 
Missile Crisis October 1962 (London: Macmillan, 1969),- 
pp. 34-35. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson also 
attended several meetings.
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launch pads were under construction on the island, with
two types of missiles being evident. One type was the
MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile), with a 1,000-
mile range, and the other was the IRBM (Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missile), with a range of 2,200 miles.
Logically, these could not be expected to be used
without nuclear warheads. It was estimated that,
considering both types of missiles, the Soviets were
developing in Cuba an effective capability for delivering
in any one salvo about forty nuclear warheads to places
as far West as Wyoming and M o n t a n a . A n a l y s i s  of the
photographs showed that they were being aimed at certain
American cities and thus about eighty million people
could be killed in one strike.Furthermore,
intelligence estimates suggested that they could be
81operational within a week.
That day the members of the Ex-Comm considered 
and assessed several alternative courses of action or 
"tracks":
Track "A" called for inaction at this time.
Track "B" envisaged sending an envoy to Khrushchev 
to negotiate privately the withdrawal of the 
missiles.
Track "C" suggested acting through the Security 
Council of the United Nations.
Track "D" called for an embargo on military 
™ateribl to Cuba, to be effected by means of a 
naval blockade.
Track "E" consisted of a surprise air attack with 
the aim of destroying the missile emplacements.
^^Abel, p. 58.
^^Kennedy, p. 39 
^'^Ibid.
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R2Track "F" was a full-scale invasion of the island.
Deliberations continued through the day, assessing the 
pros and cons of each course.
On Thursday 18 October, following to arrange­
ments made long before these developments. President 
Kennedy received Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign 
Minister. In reply to the President's statements of 
grave concern about the military build-up in Cuba 
(Kennedy ' did ' not make mention of the recent 
discoveries) Gromyko said that there was no reason for 
the United . States to be anxious about Cuba. The sole 
objective of the Soviet Union, he said, was "to give 
bread to Cuba, in order to prevent hunger in that 
country," and that the military help being provided 
amounted to technicians and defensive armaments.
The President asserted that there should be no misunder­
standing about the American position, and proceeded to 
read aloud his warning statement of 4 September. The 
Soviet Foregin Minister reiterated his assurances, 
repeating that the United States should not be 
concerned.
The discussions of the Ex-Comm that day began 
to show the emergence of two basic positions among its 
members. One group advocated the blockade, stressing 
its advantage as a gradual course that gave the Soviets 
time to reconsider without cornering them into an 
irretrievably belligerent position, and avoided running 
the risk of triggering a rash reaction from the impulsive
É2
Abel, pp. 5 9-62. Graham T. Allison,' Essen'ce' of 
Decision : Explaining 'the' Cuban' Missile' Crisis (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 58-61.
8 3
Ibid., p . 45.
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Khrushchev. Thus it would be possible to "maintain 
the options," while always preserving the possibility 
of escalating to more drastic measures, if necessary.
The other group favoured an air-strike, arguing 
that the blockade, not affecting the missiles themselves, 
was not conclusive, and not stern enough for dealing 
with the Soviet Union. Further, they maintained, the 
blockade in the event might be more dangerous, introducing 
the possibility of naval skirmishes in attempts to 
enforce it, and thus opening the way for escalation into 
full war. Accordingly, both groups decided to prepare 
an outline of the necessary steps that each course of 
action envisaged, and both recommendations were submitted 
td the President,
The blockade plan included an outline of the
legal basis of such an action, an agenda for a meeting
of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.),
recommendations pertaining to action before the United
Nations, military procedures for stopping ships and
the circumstances in which force would be used. The
air-strike plan outlined the areas to be attacked, a
defense for this action before the United Nations, ways
of securing the support of Latin American countries, and
a statement to Khrushchev warning him against taking
retaliatory action in the Caribbean, Berlin or anywhere 
84else. Concurrently, to ensure the feasibility of
military action in case this course were to be chosen. 
Secretary of Defense McNamara had given orders to begin 
the deployment of men, aircraft and ammunition. The 
military could be ready for an attack by Tuesday, 2 3 
October.
o /
Ibid. , pp. 48-4 9.
•^^•Ibid. , pp. 40-41.
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Discussions continued throughout Friday, On 
Saturday 20 October United States armed forces across 
the world were put on alert. By that day the President 
had reached a decision in favour of the blockade. On 
Sunday 21 October Kennedy conferred with the military 
experts, reviewing one more time the air-strike 
alternative. On this occasion the Commander in Chief 
of the Tactical Air Command, General Walter C. Sweeney, 
Jr., informed him that while an air strike could destroy 
ninety per cent of the targets, it was not possible to 
guarantee one-hundred per cent effectiveness.^^ This 
further buttressed Kennedy's decision for the blockade.
• The decision taken, Kennedy proceeded to inform 
allied countries: close friend British Ambassador Ormsby- 
Gore was told personally; former Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson was sent to brief France's De Gaulle; Ambassador 
Walter Dowling was asked to visit West Germany's 
Adenauer; former Ambassador to Canada Livingston Merchant 
went to brief that country's Prime Minister, John 
Diefenbaker. Leaders of other States would be notified 
through American diplomatic posts abroad.
On Monday 22 October newspapers reported that 
the United States faced a serious crisis and that a 
speech would be given by the President that evening.
That day Kennedy met with Congressional leaders, 
informing them of the situation and the policy. The 
President also formally established the policy-making 
group that had been meeting to deal with the crisis, as 
the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, 
"for the purpose of effective conduct of the executive
o n
branch in the present crisis."
^^Tbid., p. 51; Abel, p. 95. 
8 7Kennedy, p. 56.
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By now the military were undertaking full
preparations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the
pertinent directives to the Atlantic Fleet to organize
the blockade. The Navy deployed 180 ships in the
Caribbean, including carriers, cruisers, destroyers
and support ships. The Strategic Air Command ordered
its B-52 bomber force into the air and dispersed its
B~47 bomber force to civilian airports; 156 ICBM's (Inter
Continental Ballistic Missile) were placed at readiness.
The First Armored Division moved from Texas into Georgia,
8 8and five other Army divisions were put on alert.
One hour before Kennedy's speech to the nation, 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk met with Soviet Ambassador 
Dobrynin to inform him of the impending action and to 
give him a copy of the President's speech, which would 
announce the American position. In his televised 
speech, Kennedy outlined the current situation and 
stated the policy that the United States Government 
would follow. The initial steps would be:
8 g1. To impose a "quarantine on all offensive 
military equipment under shipment to Cuba ;"
2. to increase surveillance of Cuba;
3. to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba 
against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as 
an attack by the Soviet Union on the United 
States, requiring a full retaliatory response 
upon the Soviet Union ;"
8 8
Abel, pp. 107-108; Kennedy, p. 55.
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Following the advice of Abram J. Chayes and 
Leonard C. Meeker, respectively Legal Adviser and 
Deputy Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, the 
term "defensive quarantine" was adopted in lieu of 
"blockade." It was felt that the latter "carried ugly, 
warlike overtones." (Abel, p. 108.)
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4. the reinforcement of the United States military 
base at Guantanamo and the evacuation of the 
dependents of military personnel there;
5. to call for "an immediate meeting of the Organ 
of Consultation under the Organization of 
American States, to consider the threat to 
hemispheric security and to invoke articles 6 
and 8 of the Rio Treaty^O in support of all 
necessary action;"
6. to call for an emergency meeting of the 
Security Council and to submit a draft 
resolution "for the prompt dismantling of all 
offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision 
of U.N. observers;"
7. finally, to "call upon Chairman Khrushchev to 
halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless 
and provocative threat to world peace ..."^1
The following day, Tuesday 23 October, the 
Organization of American States voted on the American 
Resolution calling for the establishment of the 
quarantine, and approved it by nineteen votes to naught, 
with one abstention. The Security Council also began 
consideration of the Cuban problem. That evening 
Kennedy signed the proclamation establishing the 
quarantine, which he based also on the authority of 
the recently passed O.A.S. Resolution, pursuant to 
Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty.
90The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 
of 2 September, 1947.
91U.S. President, Radio and Television Report to 
the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, 
October 22 , 1962 , in U.S. President,' Public Papers 'of 
the Presidents' of' the' United States (Washington D.C. :
Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and 
Records Service, 1962-), John F . Kennedy, 1963, pp. 806- 
809. Hereinafter referred to as' Public' Papers : Kennedy-1962
92U.S. President, Proclamation, "Interdiction of the 
Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba," no, 3504, October 
23, 1962, in' ibid., pp. 809-831.
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On Wednesday 24 October nineteen ships of the
Second Fleet took up positions along an arc extending
9 3500 miles seaward from Cape Maysi, Cuba. That
morning twenty-five Soviet ships were reported to be 
directed toward Cuba. The six ships nearest the 
quarantine line, however, either stopped or turned 
back. Other ships followed suit later in the day.
That day U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the 
United Nations, sent identical letters to Kennedy and 
Khrushchev appealing for "the voluntary suspension of 
all arms shipments to Cuba and also the voluntary 
suspension of the quarantine measures applied.
The next day, Thursday 25 October, The Soviet 
Union tanker' Bucharest approached the quarantine line 
but it was allowed to pass; later similar action was 
taken with the East German passenger ship' Voelkerfreuhd. 
After much consultation, the Ex-Comm had reached the 
decision that, in order to minimize the risk of a 
confrontation at sea, the first ship to^berboarded and 
searched preferably should belong to a neutral state.
The Security Council met again, in an 
atmosphere of great tension, and United States 
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson proceeded openly to challenge 
the Soviet Ambassador, Valerian Zorin. Zorin evasively 
refused to admit or deny the existence of offensive 
weapons in Cuba, whereupon Stevenson revealed with 
dramatic effect before the Council the photographic 
evidence of the sites.
^^Abel, p. 131.
"A statement by U Thant to the United Nations 
Security Council and his Correspondence with President 
Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev: October 24, 1962," in 
Kennedy, Appendix 4, pp. 14 9-160.
 ^ A R
See p. 120," Infra. -....
50
On Friday 26 October the American destroyers 
Joseph P.' K e n n e d y Jr. and Jobn' R.‘ Pierce intercepted 
the freighter' Maruc'la. The' Maruc'la had been carefully 
selected as a neutral ship, being Panamanian-owned 
and of Lebanese registry, operating under Soviet 
charter. It was boarded and searched without incidents 
No military equipment was found and it was allowed to 
proceed.
In Washington, Soviet Embassy official
Aleksander S. Fomin, reputed to be the head of Soviet
intelligence operations (KGB) in the United States,
approached John Scali, State Department correspondent
for the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), in order
96td convey a message. He indicated that a solution
to the crisis could be found if the United States 
pursued the matter on these terms:
"1) The Soviet Union would agree to dismantle and 
remove the offensive missiles in Cuba;
2) It would allow United Nations inspection to 
supervise and verify the removal;
3) The Soviet government would pledge not to 
reintroduce missiles, ever, to Cuba;
and
4) In return, the United States would pledge 
publicly not to invade C u b a . "97
At Fomin's request, Scali relayed this proposal to the 
State Department.
At six o'clock that evening word arrived from 
Khrushchev, in a long, emotional letter. He stated that 
the Soviet Union harboured no belligerent intentions
Roger Hilsman,' To| Move' ^  Nation:' The' Politics' 'of 
Foreign Policy in' tbe' Administration' of' Jo'hn' Kennedy 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 217;Abel, p. 164; 
Kennedy,p. 90.
97iHilsman, p. 217; also Kennedy, p. 90.
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and that it fully understood the devastating aftermath 
that a war would bring. He proposed that the Soviet 
Union would stop its shipments of arms to Cuba and 
would withdraw those already there if the United 
States would reciprocate by lifting the blockade and 
jby pledging not to invade Cuba,^^
It was thought that perhaps Fomin's overture 
(which, albeit unorthodox, was taken seriously) and 
Khrushchev's letter should be viewed together, as a 
proposed basis for a settlement. After long 
deliberations, the Ex-Comm adjourned and requested a 
group of State Department analysts to study both 
communications and to submit an analysis by morning.
The following day, Saturday 27 October, a 
second missive from Khrushchev arrived. Unlike the 
previous one-, which bore all the characteristics of 
the Chairman's own style, this letter was very formal 
and clearly was the product of a bureaucracy, probably 
the Foreign Office of the Kremlin. Adopting a new 
stance, he requested the removal of American Jupiter 
missiles in Turkey as a' quid' pro' quo for the withdrawal 
of Soviet missiles in Cuba.
On the same day news arrived that Major Rudolf 
Anderson, Jr. had been shot down with his U-2 aircraft 
and killed, by a Soviet-Cuban missile, during a photo­
reconnaissance mission over the island . The implications 
of this development added a new dimension to the situation 
An air strike seemed now more than ever before, the only
98Kennedy, pp. 88-90. This letter has not been 
declassified in its entirety; a compilation incorporating 
both quotations from the original and paraphrases is 
provided in Allison, pp. 221-223.
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effective alternative. President Kennedy, however, 
reconsidered (much to the dismay of the Pentagon) and 
after long hours of deliberations the Ex-Comm decided 
to follow Robert Kennedy's suggestion to ignore the 
second Khrushchev letter and to respond to the ensemble 
of the proposals of his first letter and of the terms 
conveyed by Fomin through John Scali. The letter, 
despatched that evening, sought an agreement on the 
basis of the following terms:
X. Soviet removal of "weapons systems from Cuba
under appropriate United Nations observation 
and supervision;"
2. A Soviet undertaking "to halt the further 
introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba;"
3. American removal of quarantine measures;
4. American assurances against an invasion of
Cuba;99
That same evening Robert Kennedy met with Ambassador 
Dobrynin to ensure that there was no misunderstanding 
about the American position . The Attorney General 
pointed out to him that Major Anderson's death was a 
most serious turn of events, that time was running out 
and the United States was now prepared to take military 
action. If the Soviet Union would not give a commitment 
by tomorrow to remove the missiles —  he said —  the 
United States would do so.^^O
On Sunday, 2 8 October, Moscow Radio announced 
Khrushchev's reply: "The Soviet Government ... has given 
a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as 
offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet
^^Kennedy, pp. 100-102. 
^^•^Tbid. , pp. 104-106.
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Union."101
Eventually all missiles, as well as other 
contentious military equipment, were removed, and 
supervision of the withdrawal was carried out by air 
and sea.
"Correspohdoxice between Chairman Khrushchev 
and President Kennedy: October 28, 1962," in Kennedy, 
pp. 173-180.
CHAPTER III
CRISIS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS
Probably the Suez and Cuban crises can most 
realistically and usefully be thought of as events 
fundamentally political in their essence. Yet, even 
a cursory examination of the developments will reveal 
the great extent to which the parties explained and 
justified both their positions and actions within the 
framework of the law. Moreover, while the legal 
arguments in their basic form were apparent at the 
early stages, in the Suez case, for example, they were 
progressively refined and buttressed during the course 
of the crisis. Indeed, sometimes subtle differences in 
approach or emphasis emerged even between States that 
shared a largely common ground of position and purpose. 
In the Suez crisis,.for instance, it is possible to 
discern, in spite of the maze of rhetoric, not only 
reference to specific legal documents, but also 
underlying general principles of international law, 
and indeed a substantial body of legal arguments emerges 
The Cuban crisis, for several reasons, saw the United 
States legal position basically centered around two 
articles of one treaty, save perhaps for passing 
references to the United Nations Charter. As Abram 
Chayes has noted, the "legal approach of the United 
States did not, on the whole, seek to identify rules or 
norms of conduct and to analyze these by the familiar 
techniques of legal reasoning to show that they were or
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were not applicable to the situation."^
An examination of the arguments raises manifold 
interesting questions both of a legal and political 
nature. As the purpose of this paper is to examine 
some aspects of the role of law in foreign policy­
making during crises, and not to appraise the legality 
per' se of the issues, no attempt will be made to assess 
the' validity of the legal arguments or the legality of 
certain actions (e.g. the nationalization of the Suez 
Canal Company, the resort to force, or the blockade of 
Cuba,} Thus what follows is the skeleton of the legal 
arguments and positions presented during the two crises. 
It is hoped that it will provide one of the terms in 
that interaction-of-law-with-politics equation the : 
analysis of which is the object of this enquiry.
If the disputes under study had been entertained 
by an international judicial body, probably there would 
exist a more explicit and thorough body of documentation 
on the precise lo'cus sta'n'di of each party at a given 
time for a given action. This not being the case, the 
legal arguments had to be distilled from conference 
documents and from the statements of the participants 
before national arid international forums. Thus such 
historical "landmarks" in the unfolding of the events 
also serve as "legal landmarks" in the sense that they 
provide key reference points upon which to focus the 
examination.
'^The' Cuban Missile Crisis, International Crises 
and the Role of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 
1974), p. 85.
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Suez 1956
Tripartite' London' Talks:' Tripartite' Statement,' 2 August, 
1956
The statement issued by the United States, the 
United Kingdom and France at the conclusion of their 
London talks was the first formal international
articulation of their legal views of the Suez question
2
at that particular time. The following was their 
position and the grounds for their arguments:
The Suez Canal Company was an "international 
agency” as it had "always had an international 
character, in terms of its shareholders.
Directors and operating personnel" as well as 
the international purpose of its functions.
The Suez Canal was an "international waterway" 
owing to its
a. "international character," flowing from
i. its very international scope of operation;
ii. Article 8 of the 1954 Agreement, which 
recognized the facility as "a waterway 
economically, commercially and 
strategically of international 
importance."
b. "international purpose" as "established by the 
1888 Convention."
The nationalization of the Company was unlawful 
ab initio because, while the right to 
nationalize per' se was not questioned, it was 
felt that this was "far more than a simple act of 
nationalization," as it involved "the arbitrary 
and unilateral seizure by one nation of an 
international agency." This was further
2
Three-Power London Talks : Tripartite Statement, 
August 2, 1956, in Department of State, pp. 34-36.
3
This was expressly stated. Further, in his 
memoirs President Dwight D . Eisenhower recalls:
"the waterway, although a property of the Canal
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aggravated by the fact that "it avowedly was 
made for the purpose of enabling the 
Government of Egypt to make the Canal serve 
the purely national purposes of the 
Egyptian Government."
The nationalization of the Company effectively 
violated the 1888 Convention because, "having 
regard to all the attendant circumstances,
[it| threaten [ec^  the freedom and security of 
the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention of 
1888."
Com.pany, lay completely with Egyptian territory 
and under Egyptian sovereignty. The inherent 
right of any sovereign nation to exercise the 
power of eminent domain within its own territory 
could scarcely be doubted, provided that just 
compensation were paid to the owners of the 
property so expropriated." (The White House Years : 
Waging Peace, 1956-1961 [London: Heinemann, 196Q , 
p . 39 . )
In his speech before the House of Commons Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden did not question Egypt's right to 
nationalize, and the leader of the opposition, Hugh 
Gaitskell, stated :
"we certainly do not say that the act of 
nationalization in itself is wrong. Nor would 
we say that the act of nationalizing a foreign- 
owned company was necessarily wrong, provided 
that the compensation was reasonable and fair." 
(Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates 
[Common g , 5th Series, 557 [1955-5^ , V6*1 0. ) .
Hereinafter, referred to as Debates, (Commons),
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Statement' by' Preside'nt' Nasser' rejecting invitation 
'to' t'he' London' Conference'12' Augüst,;. 19'56
When the Tripartite Powers decided to call a 
second London Conference, Egypt was one of the 
concerned States to be invited. President Nasser's 
statement rejecting that invitation contained,' inter 
alia, Egypt's view of its legal position and the
4
arguments.
A. On the Company.
1. Under Paragraph 16 of the 1866 Convention, 
the Company was Egyptian.
2. "The British Government, in a power of 
attorney submitted by its representatives 
to the Mixed Court of Cassation in 
Alexandria in 1939, said the Suez Canal 
Company is a legal body recognized by 
Egyptian internal law and cannot be 
otherwise, and it is definitely subject to 
Egyptian laws."
3. The Company "cannot be at the same time 
Egyptian and non-Egyptian or an Egyptian 
and an international company, as this is 
contrary to the principles of law ...
There is no legal document whatsoever to 
show that an Egyptian limited company, 
subject to Egyptian laws, is at the same time 
an international agency entrusted with
the maintenance of navigation in the Canal."
B. On the Canal.
1. Preamble of the 1888 Convention:^ it 'aimed 
to guarantee the free use of the Canal by 
all countries in accordance with Article 1
Statement by President Nasser Rejecting Invitation 
to the London Conference, August 12, 1956, unofficial 
translation, in Department of State, pp. 47-52.
^The relevant part states: [The High Contracting
Parties) , being desirous of establishing, by a 
Conventional Act,' a definitive' system intended to 
guarantee, at all times and to all the Powers, the free 
use of the Suez Maritime Canal,' 'ahd thus' to' complete
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of the same document. (The point, by 
implication, is that the Preamble did 
not seek to internationalize the Canal.)
Article 13 of the 1888 Convention:^ "it 
clearly stated that none of the obligations in 
this agreement in any way affects the 
sovereign rights of the Egyptian Government."
the system under which the navigation of this Canal 
has been placed by the Firman of His Imperial Majesty 
the Sultan, dated February 22, 1866 (2 Zilkade 1282), 
and sanctioning the Concessions of His Highness the 
Khedive," in Department of State, pp. 16-20. Emphasis 
added.
^See p. 15," s'upra.
^Article 13 reads:
"Aside from the obligations expressly provided for 
' by the clauses of the present Treaty, the sovereign
rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the rights 
and immunities of His Highness the Khedive based on 
the Firmans^ are in no way affected," in Department 
of State, p. 19.
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Article 14 of the 1888 Convention : it 
"shows that there is no relation whatsoever 
between the 1888 agreement and the Suez 
Canal Company, as it shows that the 
obligations arising from the present 
agreement are not bound by the period for 
which the concession granted to the Suez 
Canal Company runs." Tripartite charges 
that the nationalization jeopardizes the 
freedom and safety of the canal as 
guaranteed by the 1888 Convention, thus are 
"untrue and unfounded," for "there is no 
relation whatsoever between the ... Company 
and the 1888 agreement concerning the „ 
freedom of navigation through the canal."
Article 8 of the 1954 Agreement: "which 
clearly said that the Canal is an 
inseparable part of E g y p t . "10
Article 14 reads :
"The High Contracting Parties agree that the 
engagements resulting from the present Treaty 
shall not be limited by the duration of the Acts 
of Concession of the Universal Suez Canal Company," 
in Department of State, p. 20.
9
In other words, according to this argument the 
Convention of 1888 was not being violated just because 
the Concession was ended. The Concessions would have 
expired in 1968, yet the validity of the provisions 
of the 1888 Convention would have continued. Why then —  
the argument would run --would it constitute a 
violation of the 1888 Convention to end the Concessions 
earlier ? Thus it would follow that the two are not 
linked.
^^The wording of the agreement reads: "an integral 
part of Egypt." See p. 17, ‘ supra.
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The' Twen'ty'-TWo' Power' London' Conference:' 16-23' August, 
1956
At the Twenty-Two Power London Conference the 
Big Three restated their p o s i t i o n s . W h i l e  the 
basic rationale for their arguments could be found in 
their statement of 2 August, some differences in 
emphasis emerged, and their respective views became 
hinged each on a different focal concept.
The United States
The United States, in particular, refined its 
stance and, though still advancing the "international 
character" argument, it based its position on the "system" 
argument. Thus it still asserted that "the Suez Canal 
and its operations had been indelibly stamped with an 
international character" and that it had been "built 
under international auspices with international capital
1 o
and for international purposes." But the main' locus
standi of its argument lay in the Preamble of the 1888 
13Convention, which referred to the "system" v;hich this 
instrument had "completed." This meant, in the words 
of the American representative, that the Concession of 
1866 "ha l^dj been by reference incorporated into and made
^^The 22-Power London Conference, August 16-23, 
1956, in Department of State, pp. 55-293.
^^Document SUEZ/56/V/2 and amendments, in' ibid,
p. 73.
s'up'r a
1 3
For the relevant part of the text, see n.5.
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part of what is called the definite system set up by 
the 1888 Treaty," and that "Egyptian sovereignty is, 
and always has been, and always will be under the 
1888 Treaty, qualified by that Treaty, v/hich makes 
the Canal an international and not an Egyptian 
w a t e r w a y . T h e r e f o r e ,  according to this view the 
cancellation of the Concessions (viz. the nationaliz­
ation) constituted a breach of treaty, because it was 
in violation of the "internationalizing" provisions
of the 1888 Convention, which prevented the nationaliz
15ation of an international public utility.
The United Kingdom
f
The United Kingdom subscribed to similar arguments, 
and also maintained that there existed a case of limit­
ations on Egypt's sovereignty. The British 
representative said that although he understood "the 
emotional appeal roused by the unconditional assertion of 
sovereignty," also there was at the conference a "common 
ground ... that there must be some restraint.
14Document SUEZ/5 6/V/2 and amendments, in 
Department of State, p. 73, p. 78.
15For a legal assessment of this argument and of 
other legal issues raised by the Suez affair, see, for 
example, Thomas T.F. Huang, "Some International and 
Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question, " A'JTL, 51 
(1957), 277-307; and essays by A.L. Goodhart and 
Quincy Wright, in Philip W. Thayer, ed. Tensions' in' the 
Middle' East -{Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press ;
London : Oxford University Press, 1958.)
^^Document SUEZ/56/V/7 and amendments, in 
Department of State, pp. 2 35-6.
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Authority for this view was found in the Convention of
1888 which was said to contain "limitations upon
Egyptian sovereignty" and in the 1954 Agreement,
whereby "the present Egyptian Government confirmed
its agreement to such limitations upon their 
17sovereignty."
However, the British position vras based on 
one fundamental concept—  the "international character" 
thesis -- other 'arguments buttressing it and remaining 
subsidiary to it. The British representative stated:
I maintain, and my Government maintains, that the 
Egyptian Government action [sic] in this particular 
case was a breach of international law in view of 
its arbitrary nature, the international character, 
the purposes and functions of the company, and the 
period and special character of its concession.
This view is confirmed, I would maintain, by the 
language of the important preambular paragraph of 
the Suez Canal Convention of 1888.
Thus for the United Kingdom the Preamble and its 
reference to the "system." simply confirmed, rather 
than established,^^ the international character of 
the Company, which was manifest in its very history, 
nature and scope.
^^Tb'id. , p. 2 35
•^^Tb'id. , pp. 233-4 .
19In a speech in the House of Lords the eminent 
international lawyer Lord McNair said, of the Suez Canal 
Company:
"One thing one can say with certainty is that it 
is not a purely Egyptian company. It has been held 
by the Mixed Court of Appeal of Egypt to be partly 
Egyptian and partly French and it is understood 
that certain competent Continental lawyers have 
expressed the opinion that it possesses an 
international status or character ... I should 
like to stress, in particular, ... the Preamble to
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France
The French argument, while based largely on 
the "international character" concept, stressed the 
fact that both Company and Canal had certain inherent 
unusual features which accorded them a’ 'sui' qe'n'e'ris 
status. The French representative said, ih't'er' a'l'i a :
the Suez Canal is an international public service
|and the Company has ^ very particular status . 
The Company is set up within the framework of 
Egyptian law, French law and international law. jY] n 
addition to the international aspect of the company, 
the Canal was built according to the rules of an 
international scientific commission; it was always 
managed by an international management committee.
It was financed by bonds published in five 
languages, in eight international places, including 
New York and St. Petersburg. These are abnormal 
characteristics for a company which one might hold 
to be Egyptian and only Egyptian. The company 
therefore has a very special status which the 
Egyptian Government incidentally has itself
recognized.20
The French representative then proceeded to quote frOm
a long list of Egyptian court rulings and other
instances suggesting that "the Company is Egyptian
owing to the seat of its activities, but it is world-
21wide through its objects."
the Canal Convention of 1888, because there is one 
expression in that Preamble which seems to me to 
indicate very clearly the international character 
of this company ... That Premable seems to me to 
be one of the crucial documents which throw light 
upon this very complex affair." (Great Britain, 
Parliament, Parliamentary Debates [Lord^ , 5th 
series, 199 1955-56 , 657-8.) Hereinafter 
referred to as Debates (Lords). However, see pp. 74-75, 
ihfra.
20Document SUEZ/5 6/V/3 and amendments, in 
Department of State, pp. 87-88.
21 Ibid ; see also speech by French Foreign 
Minister Pineau before the French Legislative Assembly, 
France,' 'J'oU'rh'al' 'o'f'f'i'c'i'el (Debats parlementaires) , 4 
August, 1956, 3863f73.
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Security Council : 5-13 O c t o b e r 1956
On 5 October the Security Council met to 
consider the Anglo-French draft resolution and the 
Egyptian complaints. For the first time in the crisis 
the parties presented their cases before the United 
Nations. The arguments were now further refined and 
clearly presented.
The United Kingdom and France
The United Kingdom took the lead in presenting
the Anglo-French view. The foundation of its
argument was the familiar concept that the Company was,
and had always been, inherently international. This
view was thus articulated again, in detail, and this
2 2time a historical perspective was added. Three
main arguments were offered to corroborate this the's.is. 
They were :
2 31. "International character." Substantiated 
by:
i. The fact that the name of the Company was 
qualified by the word "Universal;"
ii. the Company's "substantive ownership, the 
provision of capital, its senior personnel 
and its operation and management.»'-"
22The British representative said:
"The idea of internationalization in the strict 
sense- - a concept well know to us today —  was a 
comparatively novel proposition in the nineteenth 
century. The idea of an undertaking run by an 
international organization or entity made up of 
Member Governments was foreign to nineteenth- 
century thought. But the same object could be and 
was achieved by other means, such as the operation 
by a company possesed of an international character 
like the Universal Suez Canal Company. This was in 
effect the nineteenth century way of doing what
66
242. "System." Substantiated by:
i. Re-occurrence of the concept of "freedom 
of passage" throughout the 1888 Convention, 
which "indicate [d] the existence of a 
system by which the enjoyment of these rights, 
and their effective application in practice, 
would be secured and guaranteed."
2 5
ii. The Preamble of the 1888 Convention.
iii. The Concessions that preceded the 1888
Convention, which also were "guarantees of 
free and non-discriminatory passage."
today we should do by means of an inter-governmental 
international regime." (U.N. SCOR, 11th Year, 735th 
Meeting, 5 October, 1956, p. 4.)
' 2 3 Argument set out above, p. 6 3::
^ -I 24 Argument set out above, pp. 61-62.
■ ■ 2 5
In connection with the alleged meaning of the 
wording of the Preamble, the British representative 
said that
"As a matter of accepted legal principle,' ‘one 
instrument" 'is' entered into' expressly in order to 
'complete the system' established by a previous 
instrument, it must be a necessary basis of the 
later instrument, and implicit in it, that the 
system in question will continue, at any rate for ' 
the period for which that system was originally 
established. (U.N. SCOR, 11th Year, 735th Meeting,
5 October, 1956, pp. 5-6), emphasis added.
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Turkish Declaration of 1873, which was "a 
clear recognition and confirmation, in an 
international instrument, of the interest 
of the user countries not merely in passage as 
such but in the conditions of operation of the 
Canal,"26
Egypt
The argument that Egypt presented before the 
Security Council on 8 October was based on three 
basic premisses:
1. Egypt had a right, under international law, 
to nationalize the Company.
26U.N. SCOR, 11th Year, 735th Meeting, 5 October, 
1956, p. 5. This was "a declaration made by the 
Turkish Government as suzerain over Egypt —  and therefore 
binding upon Egypt —  attached to the report of the 
Commission on International Tonnage and Suez Canal Dues 
which met at Constantinople in 187 3,"' ibid. Turkey 
had declared
that no modification, for the future, of the 
conditions for the passage through the canal shall' 
be permitted, whether in regard to the navigation 
toll or the dues for towage, anchorage, pilotage, 
etc., except with the consent of the Sublime Porte, 
which wi'lr 'not take' ahy decision' 'oh this’ subje'ct 
without previously coming to an understanding 
with the principal Powers interested therein. 
(Emphasis added.) Text in Society of Comparative 
Legislation,' The' Suez' Canal A' Selection' of 
Documents (1956), p. 45, in Lawrence Scheinman and 
David Wilkinson, eds.,' International Law and 
Political' Crisis :' 'An' Analytic i .' Casebook (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1968), p. 103.
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2. The Company was Egyptian.
3. The 1888 Convention and the 1866 Concessions 
were not linked.
Defending the first point, the Egyptian 
representative said:
In nationalizing this Company, the Egyptian 
Government exercised one of its recognized 
prerogatives as a sovereign and independent State. 
The right of every sovereign State to nationalize 
undertakings in its territory for purposes of 
national economy and development is at present an 
established principle in international law, which 
finds expression in the practice of States and 
which is sanctioned by jurisprudence both national 
and international.27
In addition to custom and practice in international 
law, he also pointed out that " [t] he United Nations ha [d] 
recognized the importance of the right of nationaliz­
ation " and quoted the relevant part of General Assembly 
Resolution 626 (VII) of 21 December, 1952.^^
In presenting the second pillar of Egypt's 
thesis, its delegate resorted to three lines of
^^U.N. SCOR, 11th Year, 736th Meeting, p. 5.
2 o
Which states,' infer' alia, that
"the right of peoples freely to use and exploit 
their national wealth and resources is inherent 
in their sovereignty and is in accordance with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations."
The Assembly further recommended
"all Member States to refrain from acts, direct or 
indirect, designed to impede the exercise of 
sovereignty of any State over its natural 
resources."
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argument, First, he invoked Article 16 of the 1866 
2 9Convention. Second, he pointed out that the
British Government had itself recognized the fact
that the Company was Egyptian and had defended this
view before the Mixed Courts in Egypt; he then
30proceeded to quote from the relevant document.
Moreover, he added that this view also had been taken
by the Mixed Courts of Egypt in cases before them, in
1925, 1931 amd 1942. Third, and with respect to the
name of the Company, he asserted that "the term
'universal' ha [d] no precise legal connotation. It
indicated the character of its activity and did not
31have any bearing on its legal status."
2 9See p. 14,' supra.
^^The memorandum submitted by the agent of the 
British Government to the Mixed Court of Appeals of 
Alexandria in 193 9 is worth quoting dm extenso. It 
stated:
"The Suez Canal Company is a legal person in  ^
accordance with Egyptian law. Its nationality "and 
character are solely Egyptian. It is therefore 
subject to Egyptian laws. It is true that the 
Company is given the name of 'The Universal 
Company of the Suez Maritime Canal.' This 
appellation, however, has no legal significance, 
and no legal effects can be derived from the mere 
designation of the Company. There is no doubt 
that this designation cannot deprive the Company 
of its Egyptian nationality. The Company is 
Egyptian in accordance with the established general 
principles of law, and in particular with the 
principles of private international law and the 
provisions of the Company's organic law. It is 
Egyptian because it is granted a concession which 
has for its object Egyptian public assets and 
because its legal principal centre is in Egypt. It 
would be a legal anomaly to consider the Company at 
one and the same time Egyptian and non-Egyptian, i.e., 
universal. Such definition contradicts the general 
principles of law." (In U.N. SCOR, 11th Year, 736th 
Meeting, pp. 5-6.)
^^U.N. SCOR, 11th Year, 736th Meeting, p. 6.
70
The third part of Egypt's argument sought to 
refute the "system" thesis as submitted by the Three 
Powers. The basis of the Egyptian argument lay in 
the interpretation of the phrase in the Preamble of the 
1888 Convention: "and thus to complete the system."
The Egyptian representative pointed out that the 1888 
Convention had established a definite system to 
guarantee the free use of the Canal for all powers at 
all times. It had completed the system of concessions 
of 1856 by introducing provisions pertaining to freedom 
of passage in time of war and peace and by prescribing 
certain obligations upon the contracting parties.
Thus the Convention had "completed" the system in the 
sense that from an incomplete system it had made a
I
complete one. But this did not mean that it had thereby 
co-opted under its internationalizing effect the time- 
bound arrangement of concessions of the 1856 document. 
The delegate stated:
The fact that the Convention takes note of the 
existence of a concession does not deprive that 
act of concession of its internal character and 
does not invest it with the international 
character of a treaty. It is a reference which 
does not alter the juridical nature of the act of
concession.32
The authority for this argument lay in the' travaux 
préparatoires.
Security Council:' '30' October,' T'9'56
In the wake of Israel's attack the Security
p. 7
33In connection with this argument, the Egyptian 
delegate stated that "[t]his becomes clear when one 
reads the records of the conference which led to the 
1888 Convention." '(Ibid.) On this point see Huang, 
n. 15,' supra.
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Council was called in emergency session and met on 30 
October. At the United Nations Israel articulated its 
position and sought to justify its resort to force; 
the United Kingdom and France also presented their 
position and their justification for intervention.
Israel
Israel's explanation for its action was based 
on three grounds:
1. The fedayeen raids;
2. the blockade of Israeli shipping by Egypt;
I 3 4
3. Egypt's general intent to eliminate Israel.
Thus this was the rationale for the action. Legally, 
Israel based its overall case on Article 51 of the
United nations Charter, which states,' inter alia :
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual of collective self- 
defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures hecessaryito maintain 
international peace and security.
Israel maintained that the continual raids by 
the fedayeen amounted to an armed attack within the 
scope of Article 51.^^ Its delegate asked:
34U.N. Doc. S/3575; statement by the Israeli 
representative before the Security Council, 30 October, 
1956, U.N. SCOR, 11th Year, 749th Meeting, pp. 8-18.
See also address by Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion 
before the Knesset, 3 March,1957, in New York' Times,
4 March, 1957; Quincy Wright, "Intervention, 1956,"
•A'J'IL, 51 (1957) , 271.
35Wolfgang Friedmann and Lawrence A. Collins,
"The Suez Canal Crisis of 1956." in Scheinman and 
Wilkinson, p. 112.
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Can anyone say that this long and uninterrupted 
series of encroachments did not constitute in its 
totality the essence and the reality of an armed 
attack ?36
Further, in connection with the attack, its represent­
ative pointed out that there had been evidence of 
renewed Egyptian activity to carry out aggression 
against Israel. Israel thus stated before the General 
Assembly that it "ha[d] been forced to interpret
Article 51 of the Charter as furnishing both a legal
3 7and a moral basis for such defensive action." As
Friedmann and Collins have noted, "Israel in effect 
was arguing for an interpretation of Article 51 
which allowed the right of preventive or anticipatory 
self-defense,
The United Kingdom and France
The United Kingdom and France endeavoured to,, < 
justify their ultimatum and their resort to force on 
the basis of their "police action" thesis. In its 
arguments the United Kingdom also made passing 
reference to the doctrine of "protection of nationals 
and of property," but this contention was advanced 
principally before the domestic forum.
Basically, the "police action" thesis stressed
the impotence of the Security Council in that it was
"frustrated" by the "persistent misuse of the veto," it
3 9could not "act immediately" and had no "military arm."
^^U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Special Session, 562nd
Meeting, p. 23. 
37' ^ Tbid.
112.
39See statement by Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign
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The British delegate said:
It seems to me that for the. moment there is no 
action that the Security Council can constructively 
take which would contribute to the tv/in objectives 
of stopping the fighting and safeguarding free 
passage through the C a n a l . 40
This position presumably found its legal basis
in two concepts. One would be a form of the doctrine
rebus' sic stantibus : the Security Council had been.
intended to function in a certain way with a certain
aim —  the aims of restoring the peace remained, but
its ineffectiveness in carrying out its functions
constituted a change of circumstances. Under the
sanctity of this principle, therefore, the United
Kingdom and France could resort to self-help under
international law.^^ The legal rationale for the
second concept apparently lay in an interpretation of
49Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter. Article 2(4)
states : .
All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.
According to this view, therefore, the United Kingdom 
and France had taken appropriate "police action" in 
order to restore order and peace. The Charter forbade 
the use of force, but only when it was inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations and the two
Secretary,before the House of Commons on 30 October, 1956 
in' Debates (Commons), 558 (1955-56), 1377-78; and 
statement by Sir Pierson Dixon, United Kingdom 
representative to the United Nations, in U.N. SCOR, 11th 
Year, 74 9th Meeting, p. 5.
40U.N. SCOR, 11th Year, 74 9th Meeting, p. 5. The 
United kingdom and France justified on this basis their 
veto of the United States Draft Resolution (see p. 3 3,,
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Powers had acted on behalf of the Organization and in 
the interests of many of its Members.
However, a few weeks earlier Lord McNair, 
eminent jurist and President of the International 
Court of Justice, had expressed a very different view 
before the House of Lords. He said,' inter' alia :
|A| s a lawyer, I find difficulty in reconciling 
the whole of the Government's recent action with 
the existing rules of law governing the threat to 
use armed force. I have been puzzled by the 
massing and display of armed force in the 
Eastern Mediterranean that we have witnessed 
during the past five or six weeks.
He then proceeded to discuss the "complete transformation 
in the attitude of the law towards resort to armed 
force" that had taken place in the past fifty years.
In his long exegesis McNair quoted from and discussed 
the relevance of such documents as the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, 
the Charter of the United Nations as well as the ' 
decision of the International Court of Justice in the , 
Corfu' Channe 1 case. Concluding, he said,' inter' a'l'i a :
I am unable to see the legal justification of the 
threat or use of armed force by Great Britain 
against Egypt in order to impose a solution of 
this dispute ... I attach so much importance to 
the maintenance by this country of its leadership 
as an exponent of the rule of law that I feel 
that I should be failing in my duty as a Member
41Friedmann and Collins, p. 115.
^^See also statement by Selwyn Lloyd before the 
House of Commons, in' D'e'b'a't'es (Commons) , 558 (1955-56),
1565-68.
^^Friedmann and Collins, p. 115.
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of your Lordship's House, if I did not present 
these remarks for your consideration.44
44pebates (Lords), 199 (1955-56), 659-63
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cuba 1962
The position of the United States in the face
of the discovery of the military build-up in Cuba was
first made public in President Kennedy's televised
4 5speech of 22 October,1962. The presence of
offensive weapons on the island was then said to 
constitute "an explicit threat to the peace and 
security of all the Americas" and to be "in flagrant 
and deliberate defiance" of the following:
1. The Rio Treaty of 1947;
2. the traditions of the United States and of
, the hemisphere;
3. the joint resolution of the 87th United States
Congress ;
4. the Charter of the United Nations;
5. American public warnings of 4 and 13 September, 
1962, to the Soviet U n i o n . 46
4 7Kennedy pointed out that the United States would call .
emergency meetings of the Security Council of the United
Nations and of the Organ of Consultation of the
Organization of American States (O.A.S.). He said
that at the O.A.S. the United States would invoke
Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty "in support of all
necessary action" and in connection with this he
indicated that regional security arrangements (such as
the O.A.S.) were allowed for in the United Nations 
4 RCharter. Article 6 reads as follows:
If the inviolability or the integrity of the 
territory or the sovereignty or political
45 See pp. 4 7-48 / stp'ra.
46
U.S. President, Radio and Television Report 
in Public Papers : Kennedy - 1962 , p. 806.
47
See p. 48, supra.
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independence of any American State should be 
affected by an aggression which is not an armed 
attack or by an extra-continental or intra­
continental conflict, or by any other fact or 
situation that might endanger the peace of 
America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet 
immediately in order to agree on the measures which 
must be taken in case of aggression to assist the 
victim of the aggression or, in any case, the 
measures which should be taken for the common 
defence and for the maintenance of the peace and 
security of the Continent.
Article 8 provides for the kinds of action permissible 
under Article 6:
For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures 
on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will 
comprise one or more of the following: recall of 
chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of 
diplomatic relations; partial.or complete 
interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, 
air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radio- 
telephonic or radiotélégraphie communications; 
and use of armed force.49
It should be noted that from the outset the''
American argument invoked Article 6, which deals with
"aggression which is not an armed attack," and not
Article 3 of the same Treaty, which contemplates’
armed attack. To invoke Article 3 would have meant
to construe the Cuban situation as "armed attack."
Action would then have had to be justified under
Article 51 of the United Nations Chartet, thus
necessarily taking the argument down the path of the
doctrine either of "anticipatory self-defense" or
50"inherent right of self-defense." For several
reasons the United States eschewed this line of
4 8U.S. President, Radio and Television Report 
in' Public Papers : Kennedy - 1962 , p. 808.
/!. 4 9
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
2 September, 1947, 21 U.N.T.S.
R O ^ cf. legal arguments of Israel at the Security
Council in 1956, pp. 70-72, ' supra.
argument.
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The Resolution of the O.A.S. of 23 October, 
1962 called for "the immediate dismantling and 
withdrawal from Cuba" of all offensive weapons and 
recommended Member States to ensure that Cuba could 
not receive military materiel.
It based its authority on the scope and 
certain provisions of the Rio Treaty and also made 
reference to a previous O.A.S. Resolution and other 
statements. In the preamble it quoted that part of 
the Rio Treaty which "recognize [dj the obligation of 
the American Republics to provide for effective
I 51
See Chayes, pp. 62-6 6 and "Draft Memorandum of
the Legal Adviser Dated 9/29/62 on.Legal Issues
Involved in OAS Surveillance Overflights of Cuba,"
Appendix II, in' ibid ; also "Department of State
Memorandum: Legal Basis for the Quarantine of Cuba,"
Appendix III, in' ibid.
-----
See also: M.S. McDougal, "The Soviet-Cuban 
Quarantine and Self-Defense,"' 'AJ'IL, 57 (1963), 597-604;
C.G, Fenwick,'"The Quarantine Against Cuba: Legal or 
Illegal ?,"' ibid., 588-92; B. MacChesney, "Some- 
Comments on the 'Quarantine'of Cuba," ibid., 592-97;
C.Q. Christol and C.R. Davis, "Maritime Quarantine: The 
Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated 
Material to Cuba. "' ibid. , 525-45.
; I 52
Resolution of the Organ of Consultation, OEO/ 
Ser. G/II/d-a-463 (1962).
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reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against
any American State in order to deal with threats of
aggression against any of them." The Resolution was
based chiefly on Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty.
Further, it stated that in accordance with Article
54 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Member
States would inform the Security Council of this 
53Resolution. In paragraph two it recommended that
the member States, in accordance with Articles 
6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, 
individually and collectively, including the 
use of armed force, which they may deem necessary 
to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot 
continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers 
military material and related supplies which may 
threaten the peace and security of the Continent 
and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive 
capability from ever becoming an active threat to 
the peace and security of the c o n t i n e n t . 5 4
President Kennedy's Proclamation of 2 3 October,
55 /1952 stated in its preamble that as a result of the'.
establishment of offensive weapons in Cuba, "the peace
of the world and the security of the United States
and of all American States ...[were] endangered" and
proceeded to provide the two grounds on which the
Proclamation established the quarantine:
WHEREAS by a Joint Resolution passed by the 
Congress of the United States and approved on 
October 3, 1962, it was declared that the United 
States is determined to prevent by whatever means 
may be necessary, including the use of arms, the 
Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending.
53 ■ 'Ibid.
^•"^Ibid.
55U.S. President, Proclamation, "Interdiction of 
the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba," no. 3504, 
October 23 , 1962 , in Public Papers : Kennedy -1962 , pp.
809-10.
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by force or the threat of force, its aggressive 
or subversive activities to any part of this 
hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation 
or use of an externally supported military 
capability endangering the security of the United 
States.
Its second basis was international in source and 
character :
WHEREAS the Organ of Consultation of the American 
Republics Meeting in Washington on October 23,
196 2, recommended that the Member States, in 
accordance with Articles six and eight of the Inter- 
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance take all 
measures ... [y. O.A.S. Resolution.]
The President proceeded to proclaim the interdiction of 
the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba "in accordance 
with the aforementioned resolutions of the United 
States Congress and of the Organ of Consultation of 
the American Republics.
At the Security Council United States '''■
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson said:
No twisting of Iqgic, no distortion of words'can 
disguise the plain, obvious and compelling common- 
sense conclusion that the installation of nuclear 
weapons by stealth, the installation of weapons 
of mass destruction in Cuba poses a dangerous 
threat to peace, a threat which contravenes 
paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter.5?
•^^ Tb'id.
S^U.N. SCOR, 17th Year, 1025th Meeting, 25 
October, 1962, p. 5.
CHAPTER IV
CRISIS AND FOREIGN POLICY:
THE POLICY-MAKING PERSPECTIVE
Suez 1956
Egypt
Probably the immediate aim of Nasser's 
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was to 
sdcure a new source of financing for the Aswan High 
Dam project. But there were other benefits to be 
reaped from pursuing that policy. For one, it served 
as a means to retaliate against the West for the 
refusal of the Aswan loan, particularly in light of 
what Nasser later referred to as the "insulting attitude 
with which the refusal was declared."
The nationalization also provided a forceful, 
tangible statement of Egyptian independence. Internation­
ally, and particularly vis-à-vis the West, the act 
sought to assert not only the sovereignty of Egypt but 
also its ideals and aspirations: Egypt was an Arab 
Power to be contended with. Regionally and domestically 
the policy constituted a powerful move that sought to 
enhance and further entrench Nasser's prestige and 
influence. Nasser was at the very centre of his ovm
In Anthony Moncrieff, ed. ,‘ Suez' Ten' Years 
After ' (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1967), 
p . 42.
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visionary Pan-Arabic scheme and this policy, by
exploiting Egyptian nationalism and the xenophobic
sentiment prevalent in the Middle East as a whole,
could be instrumental in expanding his sphere of 
2
influence.
In the aftermath of the nationalization 
Egypt's foreign policy seemed to be characterized by 
the pursuit of two general aims: a) to retain the 
gains that the nationalization had accrued both to 
Egypt and to Nasser as a leader and b) at the same 
time to avert severe sanctions and perhaps even 
resort to force by the Powers. Egypt's objectives thus 
translated into a policy of steadfastly refusing to 
accept any plan that would in one way or another remove 
Company or canal from Egyptian control, and to pursue 
this course in an essentially conciliatory manner. 
Instrumental to this course also was to demonstrate 
that Egypt could operate the Canal safely and to 
reassure users and "world opinion" at-large to thi^ -^ ,j ; 
effect.^
The United Kingdom
British foreign policy in the Suez crisis
appears to have been characterized by two principal
5aims: a) to remove the Canal from Egyptian control
^Bowie, p. 15.
3
For example, on 28 July, 1956 Nasser gave 
assurances that Canal traffic would continue un­
hampered; on 31 July Egypt officially declared that 
the nationalization would not affect Egypt's intentions 
to meet its international obligations. On both 12 
August and 9 September, in response to the diplomatic 
efforts of the user States, Nasser stated his willingness 
to consider ways and means of reaching a new modus 
vivendi between Egypt and the user States concerning
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and b) to undermine or even overthrow Nasser^ These
aims were perceived to be interlinked. The stated
7objective of Operation Musketeer did not specify any 
political aims but it seems clear that "the fall of 
Nasser v/as assumed by the politicians, probably before
Q
the Armies reached Cairo."
An examination of some of the forces that
affected British foreign policy-making in the Suez
crisis contributes to a fuller understanding of the
policies that were pursued and their aims. Great
Britain had had a long history of involvement and
influence in the Middle East and its national interests
g
at-large in the area were still very substantial. In 
tills scenario, Nasser's Egypt was perceived as an 
undesirable influence and as a threat. The expansion 
of Egyptian and Pan-Arab nationalism was seen as 
undermining the British position in the region and.
the Canal. See p. 27, 'shp'ra. Bowie, pp. 15-17. ’•
4Bowie, p. 100.
5Bowie, pp. 21-22 and George E.G. Stanley, 
"Failure at Suez,"' International Journal (C.I.I.A.'), 12, 
(1956-57), 91.
^Bowie, pp. 21-22; Robertson, p. 108, p. 167; 
Raymond Aron, "Suez, Budapest e I'-ONU,"' Tempo' presente : 
informez io'ne' e discussio'ne, .No. 2 (1957), 9.
7See p. 27, supra.
g
Thomas, p. 68;"see also statement by French 
Foreign Minister Pineau, p. 91 ,' infra ; Aron: 
"Probabilmente il successo esigeva la caduta del 
colonnello Nasser." (p. g.)
9
See pp.16-18, supra; Love, Part One, particularly 
Chapter Six; et passim; Friedmann and Collins, pp. 92-93.
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further, as introducing the possibility of Egyptian 
control of the o 
has pointed out.
il flow.^^ As Terence Robertson
Eden and Lloyd, Mollet and Pineau ... looked 
upon the crisis as yet another stage in a ■ 
carefully calculated program of revilement, 
insult, and castigation aimed at destroying 
their rights in the area, destroying their 
friends, and eventually culminating in an 
attempt to strangle their economic lives by 
depriving them of oil.^^
Of Britain's immediate national interests in
the Middle East the Canal ~r "lifeline of empire" —
12probably was the single most important one. In
oiie coup Nasser had gained control of three features 
implicit in the operation of the Canal which were of 
the highest importance to its users and particularly 
to Britain. First and foremost he could control the 
traffic through the canal: the free flow of vital oil 
and trade were at stake. Second, by managing the ■ 
operation of the Canal Egypt could recruit its own
pilots, and there were doubts about the skill and
13reliability of these. Third, there were misgivint
about the future’ expansion of Canal facilities —  and
particularly- in light of Nasser's intentions to use 
Canal revenues for financing the High Dam project .
At the level of domestic politics it is apparent 
that the policy-making unit —  and particularly Eden 
himself— was the object of rather intense and 
persistent pressures.
^^Bowie, p. 18.
^^p. 80.
12See p.nl8, / snp'ra; see also Watt; Stanley, p. 91
Such apprehensions proved unfounded. In 
September Nasser demonstrated that the safe and efficient 
operation of the Canal was not the preserve of an elite
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In spite of the prestige that Eden enjoyed, 
taking over Churchill's mantle had not been easy.
To the Conservatives his Government appeared weak 
and there were signs that his popularity had slumped.
The British withdrawal of troops from Egypt had been 
decried by the extreme Right of the Tory Party (the so- 
called "Suez Group") as a "scuttle" and Eden was 
regarded as the man responsible for it.^^ The views 
of this right-wing group "involved an uninhibited commit­
ment to the forceful assertion of British authority in 
the Middle East" and their importance, as Epstein has
pointed out, "was greater than its fringe status might 
17suggest." Moreover, Eden had been under fire both
by the Tories as a whole and by the Press for being
( 1 g
weak, indecisive, vacillating. These criticisms of
his leadership, coming as they did from several quarters, 
added further pressures on Eden to,take a hard-line 
stance.
Personal perceptions of Nasser seem to have: 
played a considerable role in the policy-makers'
corps of Company pilots; see p.- 29, supra and
Robertson, p. 180.
^^The two had been linked by Nasser in his 
nationalization speech of 26 July, 1956.
15Thomas, p. 36,
^^Robertson, p. 38; Bowie, p. 19; Thomas, p. 36 
and Leon D. Epstein,' British Politics' in' 'the' Suez 
Crisis (London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 
chapter four.
1 7^'P. 17.
] 8Love, pp. 205-6. Robertson, pp. 38-39; Thomas, 
p. 36; Nutting, pp. 22-23.
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assessment of the situation. Nearly every account of
the crisis has noted this p o i n t . I t  appears that
Eden and most of his Cabinet perceived Nasser as an
upstart troublemaker, a demagogue bent on making
Britain bite the dust in the Middle East— a"malicious
swine,"2Q as Churchill had put it. What is more, he
was perceived as a new Hitler or Mussolini, as having
similar aspirations and intentions —  and with these
analogies also came memories of Munich and of 
21"appeasement."
Yet, while similar attitudes were shared to one
22 2 3extent or another by the Opposition, by the Press,
and by the Head of the Foreign O f f i c e , t h e r e  was a
singularly acute and most personal dimension to Eden's
dislike of Nasser. As Foreign Secretary since 1952
and as Prime Minister since April,1955, Eden had
witnessed the gradual decline, setback after setback,
of British influence in the Middle East, and in the
process his antipathy for the dictator had grown onl,y
greater and more bitter.
19Including Thomas, Epstein, Nutting, Herman 
Finer,' Dulles' OVer' Suez : The' Theory ahd Practi'ce' of 
' Hi s' Diplomacy (London: Heinemann, 1964) , and also 
Geoffrey McDermott,' The' Eden Legacy and the' Decline' 'of 
British Diplomacy (London: Leslie Frewin, 1969) .
20In Thomas, p. 37.
21,
p , 38.
Robertson, p. 48; Bowie, pp. 20-21; Thomas,
22 See, for example, speech by Hugh Gaitskéll, 
leader of the Opposition, in' Debates (Commons), 557 
(1955-56), 1609-17.
^^Bowie, pp. 19-20.
24Viz. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick; see Robertson, pp
88-89.
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Eden's intense personal dislike of Nasser had 
given him a certain "one-way only" outlook. Indeed, 
he had
decided that the world was not big enough to 
hold both him and Nasser. The .'Egyptian 
dictator' had to be eliminated somehow or other.
An instance of this perspective occurs in an exchange 
between Eden and Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs Anthony Nutting, in March, 1956, after the 
latter had submitted to the Prime Minister a policy 
memorandum suggesting ways of strengthening the 
British position in the Middle East without further 
alienating Nasser, Eden, irate, asked:
But what^s all this nonsense about isolating 
Nasser or ''neutralising' him, as you call it ? 
I want him destroyed, can't you understand ?
I want him removed ,..
When Nutting replied that at the moment there were ho 
alternatives, and that removing Nasser would only 
result in anarchy in Egypt, Eden shouted:
But I don’t want an alternative, [a] nd I don't
give a damn if there's anarchy and chaos in 
Egypt.
Yet another important aspect which probably is
underestimated is Eden's state of health at the time.
Long since problematical, his health had been
2 7deteriorating gradually but steadily. He had had a
duodenal ulcer in 1945. In 1953 he.: had undergone 
surgery for the removal of a stone in his bile duct. Two
^^Nutting, p. 18.
^^Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
27Robertson, p. 13.
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more operations followed; finally he was left with a
plastic join in the duct —  apparently the cause of
2 8recurrent fevers. Repeated surgery and a
malfunctioning liver had not failed to take their
toll and had left Eden an impatient, strong-tempered,
2 9physically debilitated man. In his book Nutting writes
of Eden's "metamorphosis" and wonders about the extent
to which it "was due to sickness and to the poison from
the damaged bile-duct, which was eating away at his 
30whole system." On this matter, Kennett Love points out
that " [c]ontemporary medical articles on cases similar
to Eden's say that the endemic effect of the body poisons
31on the judgement is literally intoxicating."
Furthermore, it appears that by July, 1956 he was "taking
many pills" and by the time the Suez crisis became
acute he is reported to have told an adviser that he was
32practically living on Benzedrine. A leading member of
the Cabinet told Kennett Love: "You- must realize in
writing about Suez that Eden was reliving 1938; he sàw
England as being slack in the face of a dictator. And
3 3he was sick. Remember that."
2 8Thomas, p. 35; Love, p. 206; Nutting, p. 26.
2 9Thomas, p. 35; Love, pp. 306-7; Robertson, p. 13 
33.
^^P. 214.
32Thomas, p. 35. This may hold implications 
concerning personality change, behavior and judgement, 
Benzedrine is the proprietary name for Amphetamine 
Sulphate. This drug is known to have a "marked stimulant 
effect on the central nervous system, particularly 
the cerebral cortex and the respiratory and vasomotor 
centres. It causes a lessening of fatigue, an increase 
in mental activity, an elevation of mood and a general 
feeling of well-being. However, its indiscriminate use 
in attempts to increase capacity for work, or to 
overcome fatigue is undesirables '
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France
The foreign policy of France in the Suez 
crisis reflected the following principal aims:
a. To defeat the rebels in Algeria;
b . to remove the Canal from Egyptian control;
c. to undermine or even depose Nasser.
Contraindications include,' inter' alia, use by 
"patients with anxiety, hyperexcitability or restless­
ness." Large doses may give rise to,' inter' alia, 
fatigue, mental depression, fever, disorientation, 
aggressive behavior, hallucinations. (A. Wade, et al. 
Martinda'le :' The' Extra' Pharmacopoeia, 2 7th Ed. [London :
The Pharmaceutical Press, 1 9 7 ,  pp. 305-7.)
, Toxic effects resulting from overdosage include
inter alia, hyperactive reflexes, tenseness, irritability, 
weakness, insomnia, fever, and sometimes euphoria. 
Confusion, assaultiveness, anxiety, panic states,' inter 
alia, also occur. The toxic dose varies widely. (L.S. 
Goodman and A. Gilman,''The' Pharmacological Bas'is' of 
Therapeutics, 5th ed. New York, Toronto, [London: 
MacMillan, 197^ , pp. 4 9 8-9.) Persons dependent on 
amphetamine are prone to, inter" alia, accidents and/ 
aggressive antisocial behavior, "In a psychiatric ' 
personality evaluation 88% of 60 adolescent users of 
amphetamines showed evidence of disorganized thinking, ' 
bizarre thoughts, and internal conflicts, compared with 
9% of 2 4 controls." (R. Brook, et al.,' Br.' J.’ Addict. 
Alcohol. 69 [1974] , 61, in Wade.)
In connection with Eden's health problems, see 
also W.H.J. Summerskill, et al., "Neuropsychiatrie 
Syndrome Associated with Hepatic Cirrhosis and an 
extensive Portal Collateral Circulation," Quarterly 
Journal of Medicine, New Series, 25, No. 98 (1956), 245-
66 .
For a political scientist's enquiry on the 
effects of stress in crisis decision-making, see Ole 
R. Holsti, Crisis,' Escalation,' War (Montreal and London: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972); and Thomas C. 
Wiegele, "Decision-Making in an International Crisis:
Some Biological Factors," International Studies 
Quarterly, 17, No, 3 (September, 1973), 295-335.
^^P. 623; see also Finer, pp. 424-25.
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Some of these aims were, or at least were perceived to 
be,interlinked.
Historically, France had withstood a series of 
humiliating defeats: 1940, Indochina, Morocco,
T u n i s i a . I t  appears that in 1956 French policy­
makers, acting against this historical and 
psychological background, were inclined to take strong 
and decisive action in order to assert France's 
interests and to vindicate its prestige.
French policy-makers too were disturbed by Pan-
Arabic ambitions and, like their British counterparts,
35sqw in Nasser a potential Hitler. In his memoirs
Eisenhower later wrote that the French Government 
"took an even more emotional view than the British" by 
comparing "Nasser's action to the seizure of the 
Rhineland by Hitler two decades earlier.
By 1956 the two principal interests of France
in the region were the Suez Canal and Algeria. The
importance of the Canal to France has been discussed
earlier, and there can be no doubt that much was'at
stake. However, as Robert Bowie points out, while
"the Canal takeover jeopardized substantial French
economic interests, ... deep antagonism to Nasser was
37the prime factor in French policy.
^^Bowie, p . 26.
3 5Thomas, p. 48; Bowie, p. 26. French Foreign 
Minister Pineau, however, did not share this view (see 
Thomas, p. 20.)
36.
37P. 26; see Friedmann and Collins, p. 93.
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This antagonism, in turn, was rooted in the
Algerian problem. The revolutionary war in Algeria
continued to be a major problem for France and winning it
was for Mollet —  as it had been for his two predecessors -■
one of the highest d e s i d e r a t a . A s  a result, there was
open emnity between France and the Arab countries and in
particular with Egypt, as it was believed that money,
arms and encouragement behind the Algerian rebels came 
39from Cairo. Hence for the French policy-makers
Nasser and the Canal were an inextricable part of the 
Algerian problem and its solution thus was perceived to 
be largely dependent upon the establishment of a new 
regime in Egypt. "We get the Canal; Nasser goes," Pineau
had said. "Why waste time on a protracted campaign to
( 40
capture Alexandria and Cairo first?? According to
Halvarde Lange, then Norway's Foreign Minister, Mollet
had said:
We want international control of the Suez, of 
course, [b] ut more important, we think it / •.
desirable that a defeat should be inflicted upoh'' 
Nasser which will result in his disappearance so 
that other Arab States will have a chance of 
withdrawing from Egyptian hegemony.41
Another factor which —  it is rather clear —  
affected France's policy during the crisis was French 
sympathy toward Israel and its cause. Mollet's socialist 
Government, in particular, shared these feelings and, 
moreover, found in Israel a natural ally against 
Egypt. Unlike Great Britain, France had few friends
38Thomas, p. 47; Bowie, p. 26; Friedmann and
Collins, p. 93.
^^Tb'id. 
40In Robertson, p. 10%.
41in ibid., p. 121.
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to lose in the Middle East and North Africa and
thus vî^ s Scarcely hesitant about the idea of collusion
42with Israel against Nasser.
The' United' States
The policy pursued by the United States in the 
Suez crisis appears to have been, no less that of 
Great Britain and France, the outcome of manifold 
determinants and aims. But from the outset American 
policy was seen to pursue a different course from that 
of its two allies, stemming as it did from a foreign 
policy-making unit operating —  both from systemic and
i
sub-systemic points of view —  under a constellation 
of forces that was (or was perceived to be) different. 
Its principal aims were:
a. To resolve the dispute by peaceful means; 
to prevent resort to force; ;
b. to pursue a policy of containment: namely, 
check Soviet expansionism;
c. to avoid a confrontation with the Soviet 
Union ;
d. to avoid or minimize the possibility that the 
Soviet Union capitalize on the situation for 
the enhancement and expansion of its prestige 
and influence;
e. to avoid disaffecting the United Kingdom and 
France ;
f. to avoid offending the sensitivities of, 
and thereby possibly alienating, the Afro- 
Asian States.43
^^Bowie, p. 27.
^^For a discussion of some of these policy aims 
see, for example: Bowie, pp. 29-34 and chapter four, 
section two; Finer, chapter eighteen passim;
Friedmann and Collins; Aron; Percy E. Corbett, "Power 
and Law at Suez," International' Journal, (C.I.I.A.),
12 (1956-57), 2-12; essays by A. Wolfers, E. Hula,
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In the context of the American global policy of
"containment" it was a most important concern of the
United States to keep the influence of the Soviet bloc
in the Middle East to a minimum. At the same time it
was essential to avoid a clash with the Soviet Union,
Thus, according to Finer, Dulles not only "was abjectly
intimidated by the seething passions of the Afro-Asian
nations," but also "was motivated by overt and covert
4 5panic before Russian power."
The Canal too was important for the United
States, but in less direct ways. While the free flow 
of oil and commerce^ ^ through:it was a significant 
consideration for the United States, it was not
H. Morgenthau,in A, Wolfers, ed.. Alliance Policy in 
the' Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959.)
44Bowie, p. 65; Finer, p.' 4 95 .
45Finer, p. 4 95, However, it bears pointing^ ,* out 
that his Dull'es' QVer' Suez, while a useful and enlighten­
ing work, is also a passionately scathing attack on 
Dulles and as such, the narative seems driven by a 
passion which often makes the analysis less objective 
or careful than might be desirable (or, indeed, expected,) 
The following is but one example:"the Suez issue was 
not colonialism, even if it suited Dulles to pretend that 
it was while he was abandoning them ^Britain and France] . 
The Suez conflict was due to the rapacious violation of 
treaties for reasons of Egyptian national grandeur."
(p. 493.)
^^Only fifteen per cent of American imports 
came through the Canal and American investment in it 
was negligible. Further, while the alternative route 
to Europe around the Cape was two-thirds longer, it 
was only two-fifths longer to North America (Thomas, 
p. 45.)
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c r u c i a l . The importance of the waterway lay 
largely in, first, heavy Anglo-French dependence on 
the free flow of oil, which had clear implications 
for the security, stability and economic health of 
those NATO countries, as well as that of Western 
Europe. Second, there was concern about the impact that 
internationalizing the Canal might have on the status 
of that other American interest, the Panama Canal.
Israel
Israel's decision to resort to force was the 
result of several factors and reflected certain fairly 
distinct policy aims. Among the principal factors 
was Egypt's policy of blocking the free navigation of 
Israeli ships in the area, which continued in spite
4 8of Israel's denunciations before the Security Council. 
Bgypt controlled not only the Suez Canal but also 
Sharm el-Sheikh and the Straits of Tiran, access t o ' - 
which made it possible for shipping to transit the 
Gulf of Agaba (with its Israeli port at Eilat) via 
the shorter route by way of the Persian Gulf, thus by­
passing the Suez Canal. As a result, Egypt's policy was
forcing shipping to and from Israel to take the longer
4 9route around the Cape to East Africa or Asia.
Another important factor was the continuing 
destructiveness of the fedayeen raids which, in spite 
of Israeli reprisals, had been taking a harsh toll and 
showed no signs of abating. Indeed, Nasser and other
Bowie, p. 29.
See pp.16—17/• supra.
4 9Bowie, p . 54.
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Arab leaders did not fail to let it be known that
50their aim was to obliterate Israel. Furthermore,
Egypt had begun a substantial program of rearmament.
marked by the arms deal of September, 1955 with the 
Soviet U n i o n , w h i c h  only aggravated growing Israeli 
fears of an attack by Egypt.
Israel's principal policy aims thus evolved to 
the following:
a. To destroy the fedayeen bases;
b. to free the Gulf of Agaba for Israeli 
shipping;
c. to tarnish Egyptian military prestige before 
Egypt could organize further m i l i t a r i l y . 52
50Aron, p. 9; Bowie, p. 54.
^^See pp. 19-20,' 's'up'ra.
52Thomas, p. 85. Bowie, pp. 54-56; Dayan, p^ 12.; 
U.N. GAOR/ 1st Emergency Special Session, 562nd Meeting, 
D. 23.
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Cuba 1962
The dearth of available information concerning
the shaping of Soviet policy leading to and during
the Cuban missile crisis makes it exceedingly difficult
to discern with any sense of certainty the determinants
and aims of that policy. The basic question of why
were the missiles deployed, for instance, remains yet
to be answered satisfactorily. No doubt multiple
forces must have had an impact on the shaping of Soviet
policy and its objectives, and indeed these have been
5 3explored elsewhere. Their examination here would
be well beyond the limitations of scope and length of 
this paper but it is possible nevertheless briefly to 
consider certain factors that may have been dominant 
in influencing the thrust of Soviet policy.
The' Soviet Union
Jt seems safe to suggest that military and '■ 
political objectives played a considerable role in 
determining the Soviet decision to deploy the missiles, 
particularly when it is understood in the context of 
Cold War politics and of a Soviet military strategic 
position by then known to be inferior to the American.
Thus the Soviet move may have sought to redress 
the nuclear balance —  if at least temporarily —  by 
attempting either to improve its strategic posture or 
indeed to achieve missile power parity with the United 
States by doubling its missile capability. It must 
be remembered that there is no evidence whatsoever to
^^See Allison.
54See A. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An 
Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior,"' World 
Politics, 16 (1964), 374-75; Henkin,’ Nations, pp. 219-22
55Allison, pp. 53-54.
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suggest that the build-up, had it not been discovered, 
would not have continued.
This course offered value-maximizing 
possibilities: the performance of missiles, especially 
in terms of accuracy, is improved by proximity; 
proximity also enabled the MRBM's and IRBM's to defeat, 
in effect, the United States Ballistic Missile Early 
Warning System (BMEWS) and thus to provide a first- 
strike capability against a considerable part of 
American nuclear striking p o w e r . W h i l e  this approach 
would not solve the long-run Soviet problem of strategic 
inferiority, it would certainly improve its position 
far more quickly and cheaply than the gradual expansion 
of the ICBM arsenal. The Cuban deployment could not be 
a substitute for a strategic position founded on a 
substantial ICBM force, but it would provide an interim 
stopgap alternative. The trade-offs, in light of, on
5 7the one hand, the "serious Soviet resource constraint,"
and on the other hand, a Soviet military and political 
position world-wide that needed bolstering, must 
have appeared.most favorable.
Politically, this move could also afford 
considerable benefits. As Horelick has noted.
since at least the second half of 1961 ... the 
forward momentum of the Soviet Union in 
international affairs had largely exhausted itself 
without yielding the gains which the Soviet 
leaders had anticipated ...
•^^ Ibld. , p. 54.
'^^ Tbid, and p. 24 3. 
^^Horelick, pp. 372-77
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These expectations had been fed by mounting 
evidence of the grov/ing military, scientific, 
technological, and economic power of the Soviet 
Union vis-àrvis the West. Some of this evidence 
was real enough, but much of it, particularly 
in the realm of strategic power, was illusory. In 
the framework of the cold war, precisely this realm 
was central ... At the same time, the unity of the 
Communist camp was being shattered by the escalating 
conflict between its two most powerful members. 
Indeed, the Chinese Communist attack on Khrushchev 
centered precisely on the unfavorable trend in the 
cold war which the Chinese attributed to Khrushchev's 
faulty and overcautious leadership.59
Thus in one stroke the Soviet Union could undermine the 
credibility of the United States globally; it would con­
solidate its relationship with China and with the 
cdmmunist camp as a w h o l e i t  would make a powerful 
statement about the defense of Cuba in the aftermath of 
the Bay of Pigs affair and by the same token provide 
an example of Soviet credibility and dependability 
to an attentively onlooking Third W o r l d . A n  impact
would be made not only on the strategic situation 
but on the global psychological environment as well. 
As Horelick, probably correctly, had. pointed out.
[i] t is most unlikely that the Soviet leaders 
drew up a precise blueprint or detailed time­
table for exploitation of the improved military- 
political position they would have attained had the 
Cuban venture been successful. But they probably 
anticipated that the emplacement of strategic 
missiles in Cuba and their acceptance by the 
United States would contribute in some degree 
to the solution of a whole range of military- 
political problems confronting the Soviet Union
59^^Pp. 376-77.
^^See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.,' A Thousahd 
Days Jo'hn' F.' Kennedy in' the' White" 'Ho'u'se (Boston: 
Houghton MiTflin, 1965), p. 811; Allison, pp. 50-51.
^^Any assessment of Soviet perceptions of risk 
in this venture should take into account Khrushchev's 
opinion of Kennedy, possibly dating to their Vienna
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and would alter the environment of the cold war 
in such a manner as to promote new opportunities 
for political gain whose nature could not be 
precisely foreseen.62
The' United' States
Certain considerations appear to have played a 
central role in influencing the response of the
United States to the discovery of the missiles. ' Inter 
alia, these were :
a. To avoid touching off a major confrontation 
with the Soviet Union, possibly a nuclear war;
b. to maintain in its immediate environment a 
level of military threat that it regarded as 
acceptable ; 63
I c. to avoid humiliating the Soviet Union
d. to avert a possible reflex reaction from
the Soviet Union, particularly from the 
impulsive Khrushchev.
meeting, as a young and weak leader. This only added 
to his belief that the American people, as he had told 
the poet Robert Frost, were "too liberal to fight 
(Schlesinger, pp. 796, 821.)
377.
Although the majority of Ex-Comm members 
believed that the missiles constituted an unacceptable 
threat, at the outset a minority believed that they 
did not alter the balance of power. They later 
abandoned this position, (Kennedy, p. 36; Dean Acheson, 
"Dean Acheson's Version of Robert Kennedy's Version of 
the Cuban Missile Affair,"' Esquire, February, 1969, p.
76. Hereinafter referred to as: Acheson, "Version."
64Retrospectively, President Kennedy stated: 
"Above all, while defending our own vital interests, 
nuclear powers must avert those confrontations 
which bring an adversary to the choice of either a 
humiliating defeat or a nuclear war. To adopt that 
kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence 
only of the bankruptcy of our policy —  or of a 
collective death wish for the world." (New York 
Times, June 11, 1963, in Allison, p. 61; see also 
Kennedy, pp. 122, 12 5.)
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The blockade appeared to maximize those values 
and offered several advantages over other possible 
courses of action :
a. As a compromise between inaction and attack, 
it could achieve the maximum possible impact 
of "communication" without striking;65
b. it shifted the onus of choice on Khrushchev: 
the United States had borne the burden of 
considering an attack and had opted against 
it;66
c. the proximity of the area afforded complete 
control of the blockade and hence a higher 
likelihood of effectiveness ; 67
d. it minimized humiliation to the Soviets;
e. it gave the Soviets time to consider the
situation, thus averting a reflex r e a c t i o n ; ^8
f. it did not preclude other subsequent courses
of action, including "escalation"— in other
words, in McNamara's phrase, it "maintained 
the options."
6 5 ■Theodore C. S o r e n s e n Kennedy (New York; w,-
Harper and Row, 1965), p. 688; Allison, p. 61.
'^^ Ib'id. Of course, by placing the ball in 
Khrushchev's court and awaiting a response, a certain 
amount of control was being relinquished. However, 
a deadline for further action had been established,
'^^ Tb'id.
^^The other side of this coin was, of course, 
that the blockade gave the Soviets time to complete 
the installation of the missiles and once this 
happened "Cuba would become" —  in Dean Acheson's words 
"a combination of porcupine and cobra," ("Version," p.
77.)
CHAPTER V
ASPECTSvOF THE ROLE OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CRISES
Much of the misunderstanding about the 
dynamics of international law and of its role in the 
management of conflict issues probably stems from a 
view of international law that is either too rigid
or limited or erroneous altogether. The deliberate
(
or subconscious identification of international law 
with domestic law has led to many misguided analogies 
and to a consequent fractional or myopic view of its 
actual role and potential in the conduct of inter­
state relations. Othètwisfe brilliant'scholarship of various 
schools from Austin to Kelsen, Stone, Corbett, Carr ' 
DeVisscher, Kennan, Morgenthau. and even Kissinger and 
Erzezinski in different ways has perceived international 
law, essentially, as a body of commands, a hierarchical 
set of rules. Thus it could only be expected that any 
analysis of the role of international law that 
proceeds on such premisses is bound to juxtapose,'on 
the one hand, what is perceived as an idealistic, 
abstruse, even naive set of rules conceived in and 
dictated by juristic minds; and on the other hand, the 
vision of a Machiavellian statesman making decisions 
exclusively in the light of considerations of power, 
influence and "national interest." As one commentator 
has noted, too often law has been perceived as
a frozen cake of doctrine designed only to 
protect interests in statu quo, , . . [or a:^
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an artificial judicial proceeding, isolated 
from power processes.i
George Kennan articulated his view of the role 
of law in what is now a well-known passage:
I see the most serious fault of our [American] 
past policy formulation to lie in something that 
I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach 
to international problems. This approach runs 
like a red skein through our foreign policy of 
the last fifty years. It has in it something of 
the old emphasis on arbitration treaties, something 
of the Hague Conferences and schemes for universal 
disarmament, something of the more ambitious 
American concept of the role of international law, 
something of the League of Nations and the United 
Nations, something of the Kellogg Pact, something 
‘ of the idea of a universal "Article 51" pact, something 
of the belief in World Law and World Government. But 
it is none of these, entirely. Let me try to 
describe it.
It is the belief that it should be possible to 
suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of 
governments in the international field by the 
acceptance of some system of legal rules and ; 
restraints. This belief undoubtedly represents'^’in 
part an attempt to transpose the Anglo-Saxon concept 
of individual law into the international field and» 
to make it applicable to governments as it is 
applicable here at home to individuals,^
Dean Acheson, lawyer and noted diplomat, made the 
following statement before the 1963 Annual Meeting 
of the American Society of International Law:
I must conclude that the propriety of the Cuban 
quarantine is not a legal issue. The power, 
position and prestige of the United States had 
been challenged by another state; and law simply
■^Myres S, McDougal, "Law and Power,"' AJ'IL, 46 
(1952), 111.
2
American’ Diplomacy,‘ 1900-1950 (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1951), p. 95; see also his Realities 
of American' Foreign' Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1954 and 1966,)
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does not deal with such questions of ultimate 
power —  power that comes close to the sources 
of sovereignty.5
These views of the law, which have elicited several 
insightful rejoinders elsewhere,^ not only are shared 
by a group in the scholarly community, but, 
regrettably, are rampant amongst the public at-large.
It is not the purpose of this paper to address 
itself in piecemeal,' ]a^  hoc fashion to the various 
limited or misguided conceptions of the role of the 
law in international society, and particularly in 
the management of conflict issues. Rather, it is hoped 
thfat by examining some of what are in fact the many 
facets of international law, by suggesting an appropriately 
broader view of its functions, the reader may be better 
able to assess the nature of the rôle of law vis-à-vis 
the problem of international conflict, and some of the . 
channels and levels through which it is effected. \
:
The following scheme, by no means exhaustive, 
suggests three principal ways in which law may play a 
role in the management of conflict issues between the 
states,
3
American Society of International Law,' 196 3 
Proceedings, "Remarks of the Honorable Dean Acheson," 
pp. 13-14. Hereinafter referred to as: Acheson, "Remarks."
4
See, among others, Richard A. Falk, "Law,
LavTyers, and the Conduct of American Foreign Relations," 
Yale Lav/ Journal, 78 (1969), 919-34; Hardy Cross 
Dillard, "Some Aspects of Law and Diplomacy," Hague 
Academy Recue'i 1 des' Cours, 91 (1957), 449-551. Myres 
S. McDougal, "Law and Power," AJIL, 46 (1952), 102-114.
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A. Law as a Force in Policy-Making
1. Constraint
2. Foreign policy tool
3. Justification
B. Law as International Organization
1. Institutional forces
2. Institutional framework
3. Lav7 institutionalized
4. Forum
5. Legal actor
C. Law as a Framework of Procedure and Expectations
1. Communication
2. Predictability
3. Instruments
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A. Law as a Force in Policy-Making
1. ■ Constraint
As a constraint, law may affect the policy­
making process in at least two ways: it provides a)
norms and rules, and b) a choice of alternatives. As 
Louis Henkin has pointed out, "law is not generally 
designed to keep individuals from doing v/hat they are 
eager to do. Much of law, and the most successful 
part, is a codification of existing mores." The 
norms and rules of international law largely reflect 
a legitimate consensus of mores and, as such, provide 
a natural incentive for compliance. It is essential 
to understand that a legal system provides rules' for 
human behavior, "and not merely the transcription of 
empirical rules' of human behavior. The process of 
policy-making may thus be oriented within certain 
normative parameters, and policy alternatives assessed ;
7
on a compliance-violation spectrum.
The existence of law, of course, can hardly 
be expected to influence the policy-maker who is bent 
on a violative course of action, regardless of costs 
or sanctions. Nowhere is this more evident thah at 
Suez/.where intense historical, political, economic as
o
well as idiosyncratic dynamics affected policy at
'^Nations, p. 89.
^Stanley Hoffmann, "International Law and the 
Control of Force," in Karl W. Deutsch and Stanley 
Hoffmann, eds.' The' Relevan'ce' of International' Law 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1968), pp. 21-22.
7
See Henkin,' Nations, chapter three, and Chayes
pp. 101-2
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the expense of legal considerations. Yet, in spite of 
the law's failure to deter resort to force and in 
spite of powerful opposing dynamics, international 
law was reasserted at Suez, as will be apparent in the 
aftermath of any global lego-political analysis of 
the crises. Further, the fact that Nasser undertook 
to provide compensation for the nationalization of the 
Company should neither be overlooked nor taken for 
granted. The same can be said for his assurances to 
guarantee freedom of passage through the Canal.
In the Cuban crisis mechanisms of legal 
constraint had a number of effects. In the weeks prior 
to the crisis extensive legal memoranda prepared by
I
the Departments of Justice, State and Defense all 
espoused and articulated rules of international 1aw, 
indicating' inter alia, that the emplacement of missiles 
in Cuba by the Soviets did not constitute an armed 
attack warranting the use of force for self-defense.^
Among idiosyncratic dynamics consider, for 
example, Eden's strong personal dislike of Nasser and 
his state of health; Khrushchev's views on Kennedy.
^Chayes, pp. 17-24.
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As it was shown earlier, the policy-makers facing the 
Cuban crisis entertained a number of alternative 
policies; eventually the choice was narrowed down to 
two courses of action. There are sufficient 
indications to suggest that law had an influence in this 
process of opting for a course which, within the range 
of realistically available and politically viable 
alternatives, was in fact the least discordant with 
international law. Dean Acheson, his views on the 
role of law notwithstanding, had this to say:
[l] n the action taken in the Cuban quarantine, 
one can see the influence of accepted legal 
principles. These principles are procedural 
j devices designed to reduce the severity of a 
possible clash. These devices cause wise delay 
before drastic action, create a "cooling off" 
period, permit the consideration of others' 
views.
The constraint of accepted norms also was seen 
to have its effect. In' Thirteen' Days Robert Kennedy’, 
recalled instances of this process:
With some trepidation, I argued that, whatever 
validity the military and political arguments 
were for an attack in preference to a blockade, 
America's traditions and history would not permit 
such a course of action. Whatever military 
reasons he [bean Acheson] and others could 
marshal, they were nevertheless, in the last 
analysis, advocating a surprise attack by a very 
large nation against a very small one. This, I 
said, could not be undertaken by the U.S. -if we 
were to maintain our moral position at home and 
around the globe. Our struggle against Communism 
throughout the world was far more than physical 
survival —  it had as its essence our heritage and 
ideals, and these we must not destroy.
We spent more time on this moral question during 
the first five days than on any other single
^^Acheson, "Remarks," p. 14.
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matter ... We struggled and fought with one 
another and with our consciences for it was a 
question that deeply troubled us all.
These perceptions were later corroborated by Robert 
McNamara :
[Robert Kennedj opposed a massive surprise 
attack by a large country on a small country 
because he believed such an attack to be inhuman, 
contrary to our traditions and ideals, and an 
act of brutality for which the world would never 
forgive us;^^
and by Douglas Dillon:
What changed my mind was Bobby Kennedy's argument 
that we ought to be true to ourselves as Americans, 
that surprise attack was not in our tradition. 
Frankly these considerations had not occurred to 
me until Bobby raised them so eloquently.13
It might well be argued, of course, that the., 
norm being espoused was a moral one and not a legal • ' 
one. Analytically, it is true, the distinction ^
between "law" and "morality" is not only valid but 
important to maintain: "Law proceeds on the basis of 
precedent, practice, and appeals to authority, morality 
on the basis of appeals to conscience."14 However, 
analysis —  it must be remembered —  separates a' whole 
into its fundamental elements or constituent parts,15 
and in this pursuit the analyst seeks to come to a 
better understanding of the parts which he has 
dissected. But all the while he should not lose sight
^^Kennedy, p. 42-43.
12"Foreword," in Kennedy, p. 20.
^^In Abel, p. 78.
14 ,Moore, p. 12. For an insightful discussion of
this question see H.L.A. Hart, The' Concept' 'of' Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961.)
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of the interrelatedness of each part, particularly when 
dealing with v a l u e s m o r a l , legal or otherwise —  
that have been inherent in the synthetic process of 
socialization and that were not incorporated in the 
value structure of a decision-maker, for instance, in 
any such disjointed, compartmentalized fashion. Is 
one to believe, for example, that moral considerations, 
whether explicit or implicit, were not central in the 
minds of the men who framed the Charter ? Did they 
dichotomize law and morality when distilling Article 
2(4) ? Indeed, as Abram Chayes has aptly pointed out, 
"legal norm and moral precept are two expressions of 
the same deep human imperative."
f
2 . ■ Foreign' policy tool
Law may also constitute an effective' tool' of .
foreign' policy and thus contribute to the incorporation
of legal norms and rules in the conduct of inter-st'ate
relations. It may serve this function in several ways
and three are suggested here : a) protection of a
position; b) enhancement of position; and c)
17mobilization of international support.
From a strategic point of view generally 
foreign policy-makers address the dual question of 
advancing their state's interests as well as preventing 
other international actors (for example, states.
'^^ The' Merriam-'Webst'er' Thesaurus , 1980 ed. , s.v. 
"analysis."
40. / , '/I .
17Stanley Hoffmann, "Introduction," in 
Schéinman and Wilkinson, pp. xiii-xiv.
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international institutions, non-governmental 
organizations, terrorist groups) from impinging upon 
those interests. Thus strategy may be seen to include 
two aspects: "an offensive component— the design
for making gains —  and a defensive component —  the 
design for preventing losses. Accordingly, 
international law, far from being the rigid code of 
rules detached from power processes that is described 
by some, can be used effectively by policy-makers for 
the pursuit of strategic (or even tactical) objectives 
for the legitimate protection or enhancement of their 
state's position.
, Further, policy-makers may wish or need to
buttress their state's position by mobilizing 
international support for their cause or given policy. 
That position will be articulated within the normative, 
substantive and procedural framework of international 
law. Thus they may draw the focal attention of "v/orld
'V.opinion" to their situation, and if it is more or leès 
legitimately founded, they may well be able to secure 
a measure of international backing. Doubtless, this 
process may be very valuable indeed for the smaller, 
less influential states.
It will be noticed that these processes raise 
the question of what constitutes "legitimate" behavior 
or policy aims, and of "who" is to assess them—  in 
other words, whether law can be used to legitimize 
violative policy. This question is discussed below, 
in connection with the "justification” role of
1 RJohn P. Lovell,' Foreign Policy in' Perspective 
Strategy,' Adaptation,' Decision' Making (Hinsdale, 
Illinois : Dryden Press, 1970), pp. 66-67.
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international law.
In the Suez crisis Egypt was able to defend 
its position by preserving control of both Company 
and Canal, in spite of several strongly opposing 
pressures. From the examination of its legal position 
and arguments above, it will be recalled that it made 
skilful and extensive use of the law and it will be 
remembered also that its right to nationalize the 
Company under international law was not questioned in 
any quarters, including the United Kingdom and France. 
Through the law of the Charter Nasser also could 
further defend Egypt's position by denouncing several 
Anglo-French actions, such as blocking funds, with­
holding tolls, mobilizing armed forces and withdrawing 
pilots and not least, of course, any intention to
1 Q
resort to force.
From the point of view of his offensive (as 
opposed to defensive) strategic aims he succeeded in 
enhancing his and Egypt's position both politically 
and economically. While the legality of the 
nationalization, taking into account all the attendant 
circumstances, may still be open to question, it is 
nevertheless apparent that legal considerations 
contributed at least to keeping Egyptian policy within 
certain guidelines. Again, this moderating effect of 
the law must be assessed in the light of the powerful 
political and economic (among others) considerations 
that shaped Egyptian policy aims. Nasser also made 
good use of Egypt's legal arguments to mobilize world
^^Bowie, p. 100
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opinion and especially vis-a-vis an attentively 
listening Third World. This function was maximized 
in the face of the allied resort to force.
The United Kingdom and France, on the other 
hand, could not hope to achieve their objectives in 
conformity with the law. They chose to violate the 
law, and then sought to justify and to legitimize 
their action but, in spite of the elaborate legal 
arguments advanced, they were unable to establish an 
acceptable legal case. Israel, similarly, was at pains 
to establish a satisfactory legal case for its action.
In the Cuban crisis the United States also 
sought to protect, by resort to legal means (viz. norms, 
processes, institutions), what it perceived to be a 
threatened status quo; through these means it also 
succeeded in mobilizing a substantial measure of 
international support. On the significance of these 
processes. Dean Acheson said:
The importance of the Organization of American 
States was also procedural, and emphasized the 
desirability of collective action, thus 
creating a common denominator of action. Some 
of these desirable consequences are familiar to 
us in the domestic industrial a r e a . 2 0
3. ■ Justification
In foreign policy law may also play a role
as justification for action or inaction. To visualize
this role as the mere "wrapping . . . [pf) policies in
21the mantle of legal rectitude" is to miss the point
20
VRemarks," p. 14..
21William P. Gerberding, "International Law and 
the Cuban Missile Crisis," in Scheinman and Wilkinson, 
p. 176.
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and to reveal a regrettably typical unfamiliarity
with the dynamics and functions of law in the
international community. The justification function
22of law operates in at least three ways, regardless
of whether policy-makers pursue it boh a or mai a' fide.
First, and indirectly, the expectation in the
international community of a statement, explanation
and justification of the given policy of another state
creates a strong stimulus to justify action or inaction,
and as Henkin has noted, the "need to justify, surely,
helps keep governments from actions that cannot be 
2 3justified." Second, and indirectly, failure to
justify warrants, elicits, legitimizes and focuses 
condemnation or disapproval on the defaulting state.
i
Third, and directly, justification provides a check, a 
process whereby the international community is able to 
assess the legality of action through the sift of 
the fairly objective and recognized corpus of 
international legal norms and rules. The mesh of the 
sift, it may be argued, is far too broad and nearly 
any action, even though violative, may be so skilfully ' 
dressed up in pious legal rhetoric that it will pass 
the test. In fact, this is not brought out by several 
international events or by the case studies examined 
here.
John Norton Moore, for example, has noted that 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union,
22For an excellent treatment of this role of 
the law, see Chayes, chapter four, and Henkin,' Natio'ns, 
pp. 5, 40, 223-36; see also Hans A. Linde, "Comment," 
in Thomas Ehrlich,' Cyprus 1958-1967. International 
Crises and the Role of Law (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), p. 144.
^^"Comment," in Chayes, p. 150.
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though a paradigm of unsanctioned action in the 
traditional sense, was achieved only at a real 
and perhaps intolerably high cost to Soviet 
leadership in the communist and third-world 
nations. The cost was not merely attributable 
to immediate self-interest or moral revulsion 
but was in significant measure a product of 
violation of fundamental community expectations 
concerning!the authoritiveness of such unilateral 
acts.24
2 5Indeed, the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" has not 
been accepted as legitimate. On disapproval by default, 
Abram Chayes has pointed out that the failure on the 
part of the United States "to issue a legal opinion at 
the time of the Cambodian invasion in May 1970 became
a significant ground of attack on the propriety of
f 2 6
that action." In the Suez case, as it was shown
earlier, the United Kingdom, France and Israel all
presented fairly sophisticated arguments to justify
their policies, and yet they were unsuccessful in
twisting the law to justify t'heir actions. In the .
Cuban crisis the justification function served usefu,!-:
and important purposes, which have been brilliantly
2 7 Idiscussed elsewhere. Nevertheless, the following
quotation from Sorensen is worth noting; he reports
that Llewellyn Thompson, American Adviser on Russian
Affairs and member of the Ex-Comm,
18.
25For a statement of which by Pravda see 
"Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist 
Countries," New York Times, September 27, 1968, p. 27, 
col, 1.
42.
27See n. 22,' s'upia.
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had emphasized the fundamental importance of 
obtaining OAS endorsement of the quarantine ... 
Thompson's interest was the added legal 
justification such endorsement would give to 
the quarantine under international and maritime 
law as well as the U.N. Charter. That was 
important, he said, not only to our maritime 
allies but to legalistic-minded decision-makers 
in the Kremlin.2 8
B. Law as International Organization
1. ■ Institutional" forces
Law plays also a very important role in the 
management of conflict issues, in numerous ways, in
i
the form of international organization. Undoubtedly law
is part of the very essence of international
organizations, and is enmeshed in the very processes
and outputs that make those bodies politically
relevant and consequential international entities.. Law
is an inherent part of those s' institutional' forces .\\//As
Chayes has noted, " [i] nternational organizations are at '
once product and source of international law. They
are created by agreement among the members, and -
agreement among states is the most widely acknowledged
2 9and unchallengeable basis of international law." To 
be sure, this does not only mean that they are law­
making entities, but also that they have legitimizing 
powers —  the significance of which would be apparent 
to any second-year student of political science or 
European law. The outputs (e.g. recommendations) of 
their processes, crystallized in legal terms and often 
espousing the norms provided by the law, often emerge 
from political battles and have force because they
706. 
^^P. 69.
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mirror a political consensus
2. ' Institutional" framework
As part of international organization, law 
provides a valuable institutional framework. In 
this role law provides an outlet where states may 
channel conflict, a formal setting where they may be 
able to air their grievances vis-à-vis another state, 
and a regulated and fairly sophisticated set of 
structures where states may seek to negotiate a 
consensus.
3. ■ Law institutionalized
The functioning of international organizations 
also shows that" "law is" institutionalized. An 
international organization may not only crystallize\and 
legitimize consensual values authoritatively, but it 
may also, in propitious circumstances, allocate them.
Law contributes to this process, IVhile foreign - 
policy outputs may be largely politically determined, 
usually they are articulated via legal norms and 
procedures, in a forum wherein they are processed by 
utilizing legal concepts and procedures, and are 
channelled and accomodated within the given organization's 
terms of a) jursidiction (e.g. the General Assembly and 
its role in the creation of U.N.E.F.; the regional 
jurisdiction of the O.A.S. under the Rio Treaty and 
the United Nations Charter); b) structure (e.g. the 
effective alternative of the General Assembly to a 
deadlocked Security Council, made possible by the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution), and c) potential for 
action (e.g. the role of the Secretary General in the
30Suez crisis; the creation and development of U.N.E.F.)
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4. ' Forum
International organizations may be a' forum 
per' se. Thus aside from performing various politico- 
legal functions, an international organization may be 
a means for states to internationalize an issue and 
to attract the critical eye of "world opinion." As 
such, it can prove to be an effective way of 
mobilizing other governments and the public at-large.
5. ■ Legal' actor
International organizations may also be' legal
actors in their own right. As such they have "some
power to create legal relations and alter the legal 
31setting." This may operate in three ways: from
the point of view of policy-makers they are a force (if 
potentially so) to be contended with, and to be 
included in the constellation of forces in the j
international system. From the point of view of the 
development of international law, being also a source 
of law, they have an impact on the international- 
politico-legal system and affect state behavior in 
this way. From the systemic perspective, they are 
actors which have the potential of affecting the system 
with more autonomy than might be assumed (see, among 
other possible examples, the role of the United Nations 
in the Congo, 1960-1965.)^^
Hans A. Linde has pointed out that "the law 
of the organization inescapably frames the terms of 
debate over the forum's jurisdiction, over its internal 
procedures, over its potential for action." (p. 144.)
^^Chayes, p. 104.
32See, for example, Georges Abi-Saab,' 'The 
United Natiohs' Operation' in' the' Congo 1960-64 . 
International Crises and the Role of Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1978.)
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Although no extensive attempt is made here 
systematically to retrieve from the case studies the 
many instances where the various roles of international 
law are seen to occur, a few illustrative examples 
come to mind. In the Suez case, the need for legal 
control and international organization was manifest, 
for example, in the many proposals to establish an 
international agency. The Tripartite Talks, the London 
Conference and the S.C.U.A. scheme all were diplomatic 
efforts that relied upon law, that sought to reach an 
agreement that would be made operational and 
institutional under the aegis of an international body 
governed by law. As Henkin has indicated.
in the conduct of foreign policy, law and 
diplomacy are not alternatives, either in purpose 
or in means. Diplomacy is "flexible," but its 
purpose is often to achieve "inflexibility," i.e. 
stability, credibility, confidence. And the law 
(e.g. international agreement) is one of 
diplomacy's most important instruments.33
A foremost illustration of several of the roles 
of law-as-international-organization (legitimizing 
processes, "institutional framework," "law institutional­
ized," "forum," and "legal actor") is provided by the 
genesis, development, definition of mandate and of 
legal status, and implementation of the United Nations 
Emergency Force. Indeed, it would be exceedingly 
difficult to visualize the evolution and management of 
U.N.E.F. in the absence of international law (viz. 
norms, processes, institutions.)
A cursory glance at the Egyptian Declaration of 
24 April, 1957,^^ which set out the terms of
^^Nations, p . 25 8.
^^See p.39, 'supra.
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administration and operation of the Canal, will readily 
reveal acceptance and use of international law:
Egypt asserted its intention to abide by the terms 
and spirit of an international agreement and changes 
in the status quo of the Canal or violations would 
be dealt with by agreement or by reference to an 
international arbitral tribunal. Significantly,
Egypt further accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice under Article 36 of 
its statute, for the purposes of referring disputes 
over the meaning of the 1888 Convention.
Many of the roles of law-as-international- 
organization that were outlined above also can be seen 
to have been influential in the Cuban crisis. For 
example, the O.A.S. resolution, the output of a legal 
structure and of politico-legal processes, enjoyed 
the legitimacy and consequence of a wide political 
consensus, of a mandate:
We [the United State^ were able to establish 
a firm legal foundation for our action under 
the O.A.S., Charter, and our position around 
the world was greatly strengthened when the 
Organization of American States unanimously 
supported the recommendation for a quarantine.
Thus the Soviet Union and Cuba faced the united 
action of the whole Western Hemisphere's ....
It was the vote of the Organization of 
American States that gave a legal basis for the 
quarantine.... It had a major psychological 
and practical effect on the Russians and 
changed our position from that of an outlaw 
acting in violation of international law into 
a country acting in accordance with twenty allies 
legally protecting their position.36
35Kennedy, p. 54. 
'^^ Tb'id. , p. 119.
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In its function as a forum, the United 
Nations provided a "world stage" both legitimate and 
highly visible. The issues and the available 
photographic evidence pertaining to the Cuban crisis 
were dramatically brought to the public eye and 
effectively internationalized. The tense exchange 
between Stevenson and Zorin at the Security Council is 
an example :
jstevenson] Do you Ambassador Zorin, deny that 
the USSR has placed and is placing medium and 
intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba ?
Yes or no ? Do not wait for the interpretation. 
Yes or no ?
[zorir^ I am not in an American court of law, 
and therefore do not wish to answer a question 
put to me in the manner of a prosecuting counsel. 
You will receive the answer in due course in my 
capacity as representative of the Soviet Union.
[stevensonj You are in the courtroom of world - 
opinion right now, and you can answer "Yes" or ^  j 
"No". Yoii have denied that they exist—  and I 
want to know whether I have understood you 
correctly.
[zorin] Please continue your statement, Mr. 
Stevenson. You will receive the answer in due 
course.
[stevensonj I am prepared to wait until Hell 
freezes over, if that is your decision, I am 
also prepared to present the [photographic^ 
evidence in this room.... If you will indulge 
me for a moment, we will set up an easel here 
in the back of the room where I hope it will
be visible to:: e v e r y o n e .  37
^^U.N. SCOR, 17th Year, 1025th Meeting, pp.
11-12.
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C. Law as a Framework of Procedure and 
Expectations
1. ' Communi c at i on
Law may serve as a means of communieation in 
at least three ways. It may provide a "language"^® 
per' se, that helps states communicate to other 
international actors (be they states, institutions, 
non-governmental organizations or other non-state 
actors) attitudes, beliefs, positions, intentions, 
norms, procedures, approval, disapproval or 
dissatisfaction through a more precise, legitimate, 
common medium. It may also be an "institutional 
device for communicating to the policy-makers of 
various states a consensus on the nature of the 
international system."^9 Further, it may provide a 
framework of reference of more or less consensual, 
legitimate norms by which state behavior can be 
assessed relatively objectively. The Charter of y. 
the United Nations is a prime example of the latter 
two roles. As Oscar Schachter has pointed out.
in most cases affecting peace and security or 
questions of colonialism or acute matters of 
human rights, charges will be made by the 
complaining states that Charter obligations 
have been violated. The evident reason for 
this is that the behavior of a state cannot 
easily be challenged on the grounds of "policy." 
For, unless it can be shown that a course of 
conduct involves a departure from legal 
obligations, the matter will normally be 
regarded as within the discretion of the state or, 
in Charter language, within the "sovereign" 
rights or domestic jurisdiction.40
-3R
Roger Fisher,' Basic' Negotiating Strategy: 
International' Conflict 'for' Beginners (London: Allen 
Lane The Penguin Press, 1971), p. 139.
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2 . ' Predict ab'i'l'i't y
In conjunction with its "communication" role, 
law may also provide a certain common ground of 
predictability. Thus states, by formulating their 
policies in the light of, and acting within, an 
international system of more or less shared 
expectations, claims and procedures, may be in a 
position to expect the responses ùf other states to 
fall within a range of predictability. The author 
will hasten to add, however, that this role (which is 
in fact one of the most basic and central to a 
smoothly-working international legal system) remains 
relatively weak as an effective feature of the 
international legal system today or as a reliable tool 
of foreign policy for conflict issues.
Jn fact, it seems to the writer that the 
principal failure of international law at Suez lay 
precisely in this realm. Notwithstanding the others,j , 
several determinants, as suggested in chapter four, 
that may have contributed to the Anglo-French decision' 
to resort to force, it is here submitted that 'if- 
Anglo-French policy-makers had perceived the future 
post-nationalization policy of Egypt to fall within the 
lawful range of predictability, they may well have 
refrained from the use of force. In other words, if 
the United Kingdom and France had been reasonably 
confident that, for example, freedom of navigation 
through the Canal would not have been jeopardized in
^^William D. Coplin, "International Law and 
Assumptions About the State System, "' World' Politics,
17 (1964-65), 617.
^^Oscar Schachter, "The Quasi-Judicial Role of 
the Security Council and the General Assembly,"' AJIL, 
58 (1964) , 962.
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the future, that Nasser would have observed the law, 
they might have acted differently. This view, 
however, must be tempered by the very strong politico- 
economic and idiosyncratic forces that were rather 
clearly at play in the considerations and perceptions 
of policy-makers both in the United Kingdom and 
France. Similarly weighty considerations, it has 
been shown, influenced Israel (though for other 
reasons and with different objectives.) It seems 
highly unlikely, however, that Israel would have 
attacked without at least the support of France.
Needless to say, this is not to suggest that 
the law did not play a substantial role at Suez, or
that it failed irredeemably. While the "predictability"
facet of the role of law in conflict issues remains 
weak overall, as it has been shown.above international 
law effectively and successively affected the course 
of events in the Suez and Cuban crises in many ways —
even in the face of very strong opposing political <
dynamics. However, not infrequently one hears the 
following sort of myopic, syllogistic formulation to 
assess the role of law:
1. Law proscribes the use of force;
2. force was used in situation "X;"
3. therefore, law failed.
Although this simple formulation may appear overdrawn, 
it is the essence of the sort of thinking that is 
source of misunderstanding of the role of law in 
international conflict.
Abram Chayes has wittily and appropriately 
portrayed the stereotype of the role of law in policy­
making that seems to be envisaged by all too many 
observers, pointing but that in the Cuban Missile
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crisis law operated as a constraint indirectly,
and not directly in the sense that the President, 
or anyone else, turned to his lawyer and said,
'I am disposed to do thus-and-so, which I think 
to be in the best interests of the country, but 
if you tell me it would be illegal, I won't do 
it.'41
3. ■ Instruments
In providing various' instruments, international 
law plays one of its most ancient roles and fulfils 
one of the most fundamental needs for the orderly 
conduct of inter-state relations. The international 
agreement, for example, and the inherent principle of 
pacta sunt servanda, make the "art of the possible" in 
fact, the art of the viable. As Henkin has noted,
[t] his principle makes international relations 
possible. The mass of a nation's foreign ;
relations involve innumerable agreements of 
different degrees of formality.... The diplomat 
hardly thinks of these arrangements and 
understandings as involving law. He does assume 
that, if agreement is reached, it will probably 
be observed? if he did not, he would not bother
to seek agreement.42
Further, international law provides many and 
differentiated international institutions, claims 
commissions, courts, arbitral tribunals, mediators, 
conciliators —  all entities that have contributed to 
the more effective prevention, management and 
resolution of international and intranational conflict.
41p. 35.
^^Nations, p ." 2f).;
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Some Concluding Notes
This paper has sought to explore some of the 
roles that law may play in international political 
crises. Two case studies were considered. The 
analysis focused on two aspects: the legal arguments
and the context of forces within which the crises 
occurred and were managed. Against that background, 
an assessment of the role of law was attempted and 
several roles have been suggested.
This study has considered eleven different 
ways in which law may "make a difference" in conflict 
issues. Several other roles could be explored, 
including its valuable functions at the pre-conflict 
and post-conflict stages. Clearly, not all of these 
roles are at present either equally or fully developed 
in the international community. Some, perhaps, may/,, 
be inherently more valuable than others in conflict 
issues. It may also be the case that, perhaps, there ' 
exists a correlation between the type of crisis . 
(according to, for example, level of threat, level of 
awareness, decision time)^^ and certain roles of 
international law, bringing to bear on the 
susceptibility of the former to the effective function 
of the latter.
It is always difficult comfortably to speak of 
"conclusions," particularly in the social sciences.
That feeling is all the more justified in the case of 
an enquiry of great limitations of size and scope, 
such as the present one. Nevertheless, a few
^^See, for example, Charles F. Hermann, 
"International Crisis as a Situational Variable," in
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considerations may be in order.
First, it has been shown that in the case 
studies the States concerned went to great 
lengths to articulate their policies within the 
common framework of the law. The examination has 
observed that relatively elaborate, sophisticated and 
differentiated legal arguments were evolved and 
advanced through the various stages of a given crisis.
On the other hand -n hnd it is essential to bear ' 
in mind this aspect when assessing the role played by 
law —  the examination also has observed that the 
crises evolved in (and to a certain extent, because of) 
a context of intense political, economic, historical, 
idiosyncratic and other forces. It is' 'imp'e'r'a't'iVe that 
any assessment of the role played by law take into 
account these dynamics. This is not because in the 
context of such overwhelming forces the role of law 
automatically should be expected to be insignificant' 
(which, it has been shown, is not the case), but 
because the fuller understanding of, and the formation 
of expectations pertaining to, the' n'atbre and extent of 
its role should be nurtured within the realities.of 
that context. The "existence" of international law 
cannot, and should not be expected to, wish those 
dynamics away.
To isolate those dynamics, first, to attempt to 
understand them, second, and to come to terms with their 
influence, third, is a necessary process in order to 
form expectations of the role of law that are neither 
unrealistic nor downgraded. Having taken that course.
Rosenau, pp. 409-21.
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the analyst will have transcended the primitive, 
static view of international law as a set of 
commands, as a "frozen cake of doctrine isolated from 
power processes" which policy-makers can disregard, 
and will have moved to a view of international law 
as one more "reality" with which policy-makers must 
contend.
But even that view is short-sighted. It 
seems to the author that it is very misleading to 
think of international law exclusively as one more of 
several alternatives which a policy-maker has to 
consider. (However, even at that level, it has been 
shown, it is more accurate to think in terms of a 
spectrum of compliance and violation than to think in 
black-and-white terms.) Law not only is one 
"consideration" which policy-makers recognize from 
among many other politico-economic considerations and 
which they, sooner or later, may have to take into- 
account, but is also a force in its own right. Thùé': 
law may be not only one of several important elements 
in policy-making processes, but also may be a force 
per' se (for example as international organization, or 
as a sociological force), often outwith the realm of 
direct and complete influence of policy-makers.
What is essential, in the author's view, is 
that a fuller understanding of the potentialities of 
law in conflict issues, and of the avenues through 
which these may be realized, calls for a conception of 
law sufficiently broad to enable the analyst to 
transcend erroneously static and narrow views, and to 
appreciate that the relevance of those patterns of 
authority and control lies well beyond any set of 
international thou-shalt-not's.
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